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THE USUAL SUSPECT CLASSIFICATIONS:  CRIMINALS, ALIENS 
AND THE FUTURE OF SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 
Michael A. Helfand* 
“It is worth taking the Court at its word, at least to see where that can lead 
us.”1 
ABSTRACT 
In this Article, I argue for a new understanding of the immutability factor employed by courts in 
determining which classifications ought to receive suspect status under the Equal Protection Clause.  
Drawing on the process-based foundations of the Equal Protection Clause, this new understanding 
defines immutable traits not as traits that cannot be changed, but as traits that are in the words of the 
Supreme Court in Frontiero v. Richardson, mere “accident[s] of birth.”2  In contrast, courts and 
scholars typically center the immutability inquiry on an individual’s technical ability to exit a 
particular class, which has led to inconsistencies in applying equal protection doctrine to criminality, 
alienage, and sexual preference classifications. 
Understanding immutability in this way is vital given the ongoing litigation surrounding same-sex 
marriage.  Courts, in addressing whether sexual preference can constitute a suspect classification, all 
too often get bogged down in biological studies or psychological profiling in an attempt to determine 
whether sexual preference is something that can be changed.  In doing so, courts often import 
definitions of immutability from other doctrinal contexts, such as asylum or Title VII law.  Doing so 
simply confuses the type of inquiry underlying the principles driving the Supreme Court’s process-based 
approach to the Equal Protection Clause. 
 
*   Associate, Davis Polk & Wardwell; J.D., Yale Law School, 2007; Ph.D, Yale Political Science 
Department, 2009.  The author would like to thank Reva Siegel and Kim Forde-Mazrui 
for their extraordinarily helpful and insightful comments on earlier versions of this Arti-
cle. 
1  Pamela S. Karlan, Easing the Spring:  Strict Scrutiny and Affirmative Action After the Redistrict-
ing Cases, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1569, 1573 (2002). 
2   Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973). 
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INTRODUCTION 
If trends in legal scholarship serve as any indication, scholars are 
hoping that the immutability factor simply disappears.  The list of 
complaints with the immutability factor’s role in constructing suspect 
classifications for Equal Protection purposes continues to grow,3 and 
the list of defenders of immutability as a useful doctrinal tool has 
nearly shrunk to zero.4  Some claim that immutability is the doctrinal 
equivalent of the appendix—a hanging appendage that no longer 
serves any useful doctrinal purpose.5  Indeed, they claim, it has no 
real relationship with the true organizing principle of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause—to protect precariously positioned minorities from 
failures of the democratic process.6  Other scholars have noted that 
immutability seems to be a proxy for the relevance of a particular 
trait to a given governmental enactment, and a poor proxy at that.7  
Such arguments typically end by calling upon courts to directly con-
sider any number of substantive principles that are viewed as advanc-
ing the underlying logic of the Equal Protection Clause without con-
sidering whether or not the traits in question are immutable.8 
 
 3 See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST:  A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 150 
(1980); Janet E. Halley, The Politics of the Closet:  Towards Equal Protection for Gay, Lesbian, 
and Bisexual Identity, 36 UCLA L. REV. 915 (1989); Nancy J. Knauer, Science, Identity, and the 
Construction of the Gay Political Narrative, 12 LAW & SEXUALITY 1 (2003); E. Gary Spitko, A 
Biologic Argument for Gay Essentialism-Determinism:  Implications for Equal Protection and Sub-
stantive Due Process, 18 U. HAW. L. REV. 571, 598 (1996) (“A careful analysis of the Su-
preme Court’s equal protection jurisprudence reveals . . . that immutability of a charac-
teristic is neither a prerequisite to nor a sufficient condition for heightened scrutiny of a 
classification relating to that characteristic.”); Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of 
Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063 (1980); Kenji Yoshino, Assimilationist 
Bias in Equal Protection:  The Visibility Presumption and the Case of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell”, 108 
YALE L.J. 485 (1998); Marc R. Shapiro, Comment, Treading the Supreme Court’s Murky Im-
mutability Waters, 38 GONZ. L. REV. 409 (2003); see also infra notes 77–96 and accompany-
ing text. 
 4 See, e.g., Samuel A. Marcosson, Constructive Immutability, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 646, 647–48 
(2001) (noting that “[i]t is difficult to find the last academic defense of immutability or 
the last call for stressing it in constitutional litigation”); Yoshino, supra note 3, at 491 (de-
scribing attacks on immutability as “flog[ging] a dying horse”); Jonathan Pickhardt, Note, 
Choose or Lose:  Embracing Theories of Choice in Gay Rights Litigation Strategies, 73 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 921, 942 (1998) (“Arguments for suspect classification status for sexual orientation 
based on immutability have been almost completely rejected.”). 
 5 See infra notes 97–114 and accompanying text. 
 6 See infra notes 47–54 and accompanying text. 
 7 See ELY, supra note 3; see also infra Section VII. 
 8 See, e.g., J. M. Balkin, The Constitution of Status, 106 YALE L.J. 2313, 2323–24 (1997) (argu-
ing that the real question for classification ought to be whether the particular characteris-
tic can sustain a stable social meaning); Daniel Farber & Suzanna Sherry, The Pariah Prin-
ciple, 13 CONST. COMMENT. 257 (1996); Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection 
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And yet, even in the face of all this criticism, the immutability fac-
tor continues to animate judicial decisions, serving as a focal point in 
the ongoing litigations over state statutory schemes prohibiting same-
sex marriage.9  Indeed, immutability received its most recent atten-
tion in the California,10 Connecticut,11 and Iowa12 Supreme Court de-
 
Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107, 155 (1976); Halley, supra note 3, at 50–63 (adopting First 
Amendment distinctions between speech and conduct in order to determine when inter-
ference with legislation on substantive grounds is legitimate); Cass R. Sunstein, The Anti-
caste Principle, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2410 (1994); Tribe, supra note 3, at 1066–67 (arguing that 
substantive justifications for the suspect classification status lurk behind the standard 
process-based account); Note, Developments in the Law:  Sexual Orientation and the Law, 102 
HARV. L. REV. 1508, 1532–34 (1989) (arguing in favor of granting homosexuality suspect 
status on multiple grounds including the equal worth of human beings); cf., Suzanne B. 
Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 481, 533 (2004) (arguing in favor of a 
new context-sensitive test for evaluating potential Equal Protection violations, including 
consideration of “whether the classification reflects disapproval, dislike, or stereotyping of 
the class”). 
 9 See, e.g., Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915, 939 (4th Cir. 1996) (Luttig, J., concurring) (ar-
guing that “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” discriminates on the basis of a combination of both 
status and conduct, which prevents the underlying classification from being termed im-
mutable); High Tech Gays v. Def. Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 573 (9th 
Cir. 1990) (“Homosexuality is not an immutable characteristic; it is behavioral and hence 
is fundamentally different from traits such as race, gender, or alienage, which define al-
ready existing suspect and quasi-suspect classes.”); Watkins v. U.S. Army, 875 F.2d 699, 
726 (9th Cir. 1989) (Norris, J., concurring) (noting that immutability “may describe those 
traits that are so central to a person’s identity that it would be abhorrent for government 
to penalize a person for refusing to change them,” thereby making sexual orientation 
immutable); Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068, 1076 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (“Homo-
sexuality, as a definitive trait, differs fundamentally from those defining any of the recog-
nized suspect or quasi-suspect classes.  Members of recognized suspect or quasi-suspect 
classes, e.g., blacks or women, exhibit immutable characteristics, whereas homosexuality 
is primarily behavioral in nature.”); Equal. Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc., v. City of 
Cincinnati, 860 F. Supp. 417, 437 (S.D. Ohio 1994) (holding that sexual orientation clas-
sifications are subject to heightened scrutiny because, inter alia, sexual orientation is a 
characteristic “beyond the control of the individual”), rev’d 54 F.3d 261 (6th Cir. 1995), 
vacated 518 U.S. 1001 (1996), reinstated on reh’g 128 F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 1997); Jantz v. Muci, 
759 F. Supp. 1543, 1548 (D. Kan. 1991) (defining immutable traits as those that can be 
changed “only . . . at a prohibitive cost” and finding sexual orientation to be immutable), 
rev’d 976 F.2d 623 (10th Cir. 1992); Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307, 330 (D.C. 
1995) (concluding that “the question whether appellants’ constitutional rights to due 
process and equal protection of the laws, while not presenting any genuine issue of mate-
rial ‘adjudicative’ fact in this case, requires . . . some findings about the origins of homo-
sexuality and the extent to which sexual orientation is immutable”); Andersen v. King 
County, 138 P.3d 963, 974 (Wash. 2006) (holding that plaintiffs had failed to demon-
strate that sexual orientation was an immutable trait and therefore had failed to satisfy all 
necessary elements for achieving suspect status). 
 10 In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 442–43, 452 (Cal. 2008).  The issue of same-sex mar-
riage has remained hotly contested because of the continued controversy over Califor-
nia’s Proposition 8, which effectively overturned the California Supreme Court’s ruling 
that the statute prohibiting same-sex marriage was unconstitutional under California’s 
state constitution.  See CAL. CONST., art. I, § 7.5 (“Only marriage between a man and a 
woman is valid or recognized in California.”); Text of Proposed Laws, available at 
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cisions considering same-sex marriage, and has been an important 
piece of any number of decisions considering the issue.13  Moreover, 
given the sharp increase in litigation surrounding same-sex marriage, 
the number of cases focusing on immutability is clearly slated for an 
upswing.14 
But understanding the persistence of immutability first requires 
defining the term.  While some authors and judges often adduce the 
dictionary definition in order to facilitate analysis,15 the very defini-
tion of the term remains deeply ambiguous.  In this Article, I argue 
that it is confusion over the basic definition of immutability that has 
led, in part, to the criticism of its inclusion in equal protection analy-
 
http://voterguide.sos.ca.gov/past/2008/general/text-proposed-laws/text-of-proposed-
laws.pdf; see also State Election Results, Election Center 2008, CNN.com, http://www. 
cnn.com/ELECTION/2008/results/state/#CA (last visited Oct. 3, 2009).  The California 
Supreme Court subsequently upheld Proposition 8 in Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48 (Cal. 
2009); see also News Release, Judicial Council of California, California Supreme Court 
Takes Action on Proposition 8 (Nov. 19, 2008), available at 
http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/presscenter/newsreleases/NR66-08.PDF; Jesse McKinley, 
Top Court in California Will Review Proposition 8, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2008, at A20. 
 11 Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 438 (Conn. 2008). 
 12 Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 886–87 (Iowa 2009). 
 13 The issue of immutability was emphasized in the following decisions:  Dean v. District of 
Columbia, 653 A.2d 307 (D.C. 1995); Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571 (Md. 2007); Littleton 
v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223 (Tex. App. 1999); Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999); Andersen 
v. King County, 138 P.3d 963, 990 (Wash. 2006); and Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. 
Ct. App. 1974). 
 14 Indeed, in the last ten years, an increasing number of states have considered the ques-
tion, in various forms, of whether statutory provisions prohibiting same-sex marriage are 
constitutional.  Examples of these state decisions include:  Standhardt v. Superior Court ex 
rel. County of Maricopa, 77 P.3d 451, 465 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that the state con-
stitution did not guarantee a right to same-sex marriage); Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384; 
Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 427–28 (“It is evident, moreover, that immutability and minority sta-
tus or political powerlessness are subsidiary to the first two primary factors because . . . the 
Supreme Court has granted suspect class status to a group whose distinguishing charac-
teristic is not immutable.”); Frandsen v. County of Brevard, 800 So. 2d 757, 760 (Fla. Ct. 
App. 2001) (holding that the state’s statutory scheme, understood as prohibiting same-
sex marriage, did not violate the state constitution), aff’d 828 So. 2d 386 (Fla. 2002); In re 
Estate of Hall, 707 N.E.2d 201, 206 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998) (prohibiting same-sex marriage); 
Morrison v. Sadler, 821 N.E.2d 15, 38 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that Indiana’s Defense 
of Marriage Act did not violate the state constitution); Varnum, 763 N.W.2d 862; Lewis v. 
Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 224 (N.J. 2006) (holding that prohibiting same-sex marriage does 
not violate the state constitution); Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 12 (N.Y. 2006) (hold-
ing that New York’s marriage statutes, which do not permit same-sex marriage, were not 
unconstitutional); Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 972–74 (Mass. 
2003) (holding that denying a marriage license to a same-sex couple was unconstitutional 
under the Massachusetts constitution); Conaway, 932 A.2d at 635 (upholding the state’s 
statutory scheme that defined marriage as between a “man” and a “woman”); Andersen, 
138 P.3d at 990 (holding that Washington’s Defense of Marriage Act did not violate the 
state constitution). 
 15 See infra note 77. 
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sis.  Indeed, this confusion goes far beyond debates over functional 
versus constructive immutability.16  Scholars and courts alike regularly 
demonstrate a basic uncertainty as to whether an immutable trait is a 
trait that has not been chosen,17 a trait that cannot be changed,18 or a 
trait that an individual should not be forced to change.19 
The continued division over the very definition of immutability 
can be seen in the California, Connecticut, and Iowa state supreme 
court decisions addressing statutory provisions prohibiting same-sex 
marriage.20  While all three courts, on the surface, advanced similar 
definitions of the term,21 their analyses of the immutability factor 
clearly indicate three very different understandings of what immuta-
bility means.22 
On the one hand, the Iowa Supreme Court held that “the immu-
tability ‘prong of the suspectness inquiry surely is satisfied 
when . . . the identifying trait is so central to a person’s identity that it 
would be abhorrent for government to penalize a person for refusing 
 
 16 See Knauer, supra note 3, at 74 (noting that “[t]he handful of judicial opinions that have 
advocated heightened scrutiny for gay men and lesbians have not required strict immuta-
bility, but have instead focused on whether sexual orientation is difficult to change”); see 
generally Marcosson, supra note 4, at 650 (arguing for “a new vision of immutabil-
ity, . . . ‘constructive immutability,’ which overcomes the objections of social construction 
theory by showing that a characteristic can be, for all relevant legal and political pur-
poses, immutable even if it is the product of social construction”). 
 17 See, e.g., United States v. Coleman, 166 F.3d 428, 431 (2d Cir. 1999); United States v. Har-
ris, 537 F.2d 563, 565 n.2 (1st Cir. 1976); Carbonaro v. Reeher, 392 F. Supp. 753, 757 
(E.D. Pa. 1975); cf. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 219 n.19 (1982) (focusing on the volun-
tariness of entering a classification).  For a discussion of Plyler and its use of an entrance-
based definition of immutability, see infra notes 203–09 and accompanying text. 
 18 This is of course the dominant definition.  See infra note 77 (collecting examples). 
 19 See, e.g., Hernandez-Montiel v. I.N.S., 225 F.3d 1084, 1093 (9th Cir. 2000); Able v. United 
States, 968 F. Supp. 850, 863 (E.D.N.Y. 1997), rev’d on other grounds, 155 F.3d 628 (2d Cir. 
1998); Jantz v. Muci, 759 F. Supp. 1543, 1548 (D. Kan. 1991) (noting that sexual orienta-
tion is not “easily mutable”) (emphasis added) rev’d 976 F.2d 623 (10th Cir. 1992); In re A-
M-E- & J-G-U-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 69, 73–74 (B.I.A. 2007); In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211 
(B.I.A. 1985); In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 442. 
 20 See supra notes 10–12. 
 21 Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 442–43 (defining an immutable trait as a trait over which an 
individual does not have “control”); Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 
436 (Conn. 2008) (defining immutability as “[t]he degree to which an individual con-
trols, or cannot avoid, the acquisition of a defining trait, and the relative ease or difficulty 
with which a trait can be changed”) (quoting Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307, 
346 (D.C. 1995)); Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 892 (Iowa 2009) (“A human trait 
that defines a group is ‘immutable’ when the trait exists ‘solely by the accident of birth,’ 
or when the person with the trait has no ability to change it.”) (citations omitted). 
 22 Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 442–43; Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 438; Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 892–
93. 
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to change [it].’”23  In other words, the Iowa Supreme Court held that 
because sexual orientation is so central to an individual’s identity, 
sexual orientation is, in fact, immutable for the purposes of suspect 
classification analysis.  In this way, the argument from identity helped 
satisfy the immutability inquiry. 
In contrast, the Connecticut Supreme Court appears to have con-
cluded that the identity argument explains not why the immutability 
factor was satisfied, but why sexual orientation could be deemed a 
suspect classification even if the immutability factor were not satis-
fied.  In doing so, the Connecticut Supreme Court explained that 
immutability is a factor that is meant to aid courts in determining 
whether particular discrimination is “unfair,”24 and whether the 
members of the class are truly being “victimized.”25  In turn, the Con-
necticut Supreme Court concluded that “[i]n view of the central role 
that sexual orientation plays in a person’s fundamental right to self-
determination,” sexual orientation classifications should receive 
heightened scrutiny.26  And, the Connecticut Supreme Court believed 
that because the “identifying trait is so central to a person’s iden-
tity . . . it would be abhorrent for government to penalize a person for 
refusing to change it.”27  Accordingly, the court believed that “it [was] 
not necessary . . . to decide whether sexual orientation is immutable in 
the same way and to the same extent that race, national origin and 
gender are immutable.”28  In this way, the identity argument appears 
to have explained why the Connecticut Supreme Court did not be-
lieve sexual orientation’s immutability was relevant for its suspect-
classification analysis. 
The California Supreme Court’s decision is ambiguous on this 
point, failing to clarify exactly how it understands the impact of the 
identity argument on the application of the immutability factor.  
Thus, the California Supreme Court stated that “[b]ecause a person’s 
sexual orientation is so integral an aspect of one’s identity, it is not 
appropriate to require a person to repudiate or change his or her 
 
 23 Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 893 (quoting Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 438) (internal quotation marks 
and citations omitted). 
 24 Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 436 (quoting High Tech Gays v. Def. Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 
909 F.2d 375, 377 (9th Cir. 1990) (Canby, J., dissenting)). 
 25 Id. (quoting Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d at 346 (Ferren, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part)). 
 26 Id. at 438. 
 27 Id. (quoting Watkins v. U.S. Army, 875 F.2d 699, 726 (9th Cir. 1989) (Norris, J., concur-
ring) (alterations, citation, and internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 28 Id. at 437 (emphasis added). 
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sexual orientation in order to avoid discriminatory treatment.”29  In 
supporting this proposition, the California Supreme Court relied on 
a Ninth Circuit decision addressing the definition of immutability, 
which provided an alternative definition of immutability in the con-
text of asylum law:  “[s]exual orientation and sexual identity . . . are 
so fundamental to one’s identity that a person should not be re-
quired to abandon them.”30  In reaching this conclusion, the Califor-
nia Supreme Court did not explain why the fact that sexual orienta-
tion is so important to an individual’s identity entails not requiring 
sexual orientation to be immutable.  This may be because—as per the 
Iowa Supreme Court—when a trait is fundamental to an individual’s 
identity, it is considered, for the purposes of suspect-classification 
analysis, immutable, or because—as per the Connecticut Supreme 
Court—when a trait is fundamental to an individual’s identity, it is 
not required to be immutable. 
As these examples demonstrate, the definition of immutability 
remains contested, especially in its relationship to arguments about 
the centrality of sexual orientation to individual identity.  In merging 
arguments from identity with the definition of immutability, courts 
appear to struggle with defining immutability, unsure as to whether a 
trait is immutable only when it is a trait that the individual can con-
trol, whether a trait is central to an individual’s identity, both or nei-
ther.  And, as the aforementioned state supreme court decisions 
demonstrate, this is even true among courts that reach near identical 
outcomes;31 other courts, especially those reaching contrary out-
comes, remain at odds over whether traits are immutable when the 
traits have not been freely adopted, or alternatively when the traits 
cannot be changed.32  Indeed, the divergence of various definitions of 
the term immutability has left courts in a quandary when confronting 
the term.33 
This Article argues that this confusion stems from, in part, a fail-
ure to recognize that the definition of immutability is clearly contex-
tual.  Already, immutability is understood differently when used in 
the Title VII context,34 than when used in the asylum context.35  But 
 
 29 In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 442 (Cal. 2008). 
 30 Id. (citing, inter alia, Hernandez-Montiel v. I.N.S. 225 F.3d 1084, 1093 (9th Cir. 2000)). 
 31 Marriage Cases,183 P.3d at 442–43; Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 438; Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 
862, 892 (Iowa 2009). 
 32 See infra notes 77, 191–92. 
 33 See supra notes 17–19 and accompanying text (outlining the various definitions of the 
term immutability). 
 34 See infra Part V.B. 
 35 See infra Part V.A. 
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many courts have not appreciated the significance of this context-
sensitivity, importing definitions from contexts whose internal logic is 
not easily reconciled with the logic driving equal protection analysis.36  
By importing conflicting definitions, courts have obscured the defini-
tion of immutability in the equal protection context, making it diffi-
cult to understand the link between the immutability factor and the 
underlying logic of suspect-classification analysis. 
Accordingly, the twin goals of this Article are to highlight the con-
textual character of the immutability factor and to explore the poten-
tial link between immutability and the underlying logic of the Equal 
Protection Clause.37  By mining the inner-logic of the equal protec-
tion doctrine—and not by importing incompatible definitions from 
other doctrinal contexts—I argue that the immutability factor in the 
equal protection context is not concerned with whether or not a trait 
can be changed, but whether an individual chose the trait in ques-
tion.  Thus, the immutability inquiry in the equal protection context 
is not concerned with whether people can exit a classification, but 
whether they chose to enter the classification. 
Using immutability to focus on entrance into a classification, as 
opposed to exit from it, ensures that immutability advances one of 
the primary principles underlying the suspect classification inquiry:  
determining whether imposing “legal burdens” on the classification 
“bear[s] some relationship to individual responsibility.”38  Indeed, it is 
because of the unique purpose of deploying the immutability factor 
in the equal protection context that the Supreme Court linked im-
mutable traits to “accident[s] of birth”;39 it is also why the D.C. Circuit 
has noted on one occasion that “the ‘immutable characteristic’ no-
tion, as it appears in Supreme Court decisions, is tightly-cabined.  It 
does not mean, broadly, something done that cannot be undone.  In-
stead, it is a trait ‘determined solely by accident of birth.’”40  Defining 
immutability in this way helps focus courts’ attention on whether the 
classification in question could have been employed legitimately and, 
in turn, highlights the way in which the immutability factor advances 
the underlying process-based framework of the Equal Protection 
Clause. 
 
 36 See infra notes 153–58 and accompanying text. 
 37 See infra notes 165–92 and accompanying text. 
 38 Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (quoting Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. 
Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972)). 
 39 Id. 
 40 Quiban v. Veterans Admin., 928 F.2d 1154, 1160 n.13 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (quoting Schweik-
er v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 229 n.11 (1981)). 
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This definitional shift is of utmost importance to the continued 
litigation surrounding same-sex marriage.  Much of the debate con-
cerning immutability and same-sex marriage has gotten bogged down 
in biological and psychological studies regarding whether sexual pre-
ference is the type of trait that can be changed.41  While some courts 
have embraced such questions,42 understanding immutability in the 
equal protection context as completely uninterested in whether indi-
viduals can change a trait ensures that courts avoid the value-laden 
waters of psycho-biology in favor of legal standards more familiar to 
judicial determinations.  As a result, reorienting immutability as con-
cerned with entrance into a classification is vital if courts addressing 
the continued litigation surrounding same-sex marriage are to apply 
a set of doctrines that coheres with the Equal Protection Clause’s 
process-based paradigm. 
To do so, I begin, in Parts II through IV, by presenting the proc-
ess-based account of equal protection.  While this account is far from 
free of critics,43 it persists, and continues to drive the “traditional in-
dicia of suspectedness” which are consistently considered by the 
Court in determining whether or not a particular classification ought 
to be considered suspect.44  Doing so also serves to expose many of 
 
 41 For a general example, see Edward Stein, Born That Way?  Not a Choice?  Problems with Bio-
logical and Psychological Arguments for Gay Rights 5 (Benjamin N. Cardozo Sch. of Law, Car-
dozo Legal Studies Research Paper No. 223, 2008), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1104538; see also David Orgon Coo-
lidge, Should the Government Recognize Same-Sex Marriage?  Session Two:  Legal, Equitable, and 
Political Issues, 7 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 33, 40–42 (2000); David A.J. Richards, Sex-
ual Preference as a Suspect (Religious) Classification:  An Alternative Perspective on the Unconstitu-
tionality of Anti-Lesbian/Gay Initiatives, 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 491, 502–03 (1994); Edward Stein, 
The Relevance of Scientific Research About Sexual Orientation to Lesbian and Gay Rights, 27 J. 
HOMOSEXUALITY 269 (1994) (discussing the relevance of scientific research to questions 
of lesbian and gay rights); Lynn D. Wardle, The Biological Causes and Consequences of Homo-
sexual Behavior and Their Relevance for Family Law Policies, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 997, 997 
(2007) (focusing on “the biological effects of homosexual behavior on human health”); 
Rachel Duffy Lorenz, Comment, Transgender Immigration:  Legal Same-Sex Marriages and 
Their Implications for the Defense of Marriage Act, 53 UCLA L. REV. 523, 528–29 (2005). 
 42 See, e.g., Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307, 330–31 (D.C. 1995) (considering “the 
nature and causes of homosexuality”); see also Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571, 615–16 
n.57 (Md. 2007) (discussing scientific studies regarding sexual preferences and biological 
“immutability”). 
 43 See infra note 55. 
 44 The Supreme Court has consistently relied upon what it has termed the “traditional indi-
cia of suspectedness,” considering whether the class is “saddled with such disabilities, or 
subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a posi-
tion of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majori-
tarian political process.”  Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 375 n.14 (1974) (internal qu-
otation marks omitted) (quoting San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 
28 (1973)); see also Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 506 n.13 (1976) (same); Mass. Bd. of 
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the internal fissures in equal protection doctrine, highlighting the 
need to reconsider the way in which the immutability factor fits with-
in the overall structure of the Equal Protection Clause. 
Next, in Part V, I examine the definitions of immutability in other 
areas of law, specifically in the Title VII and asylum contexts.  In turn, 
I explain how different definitions of immutability fit within their re-
spective areas of law, given the principles driving each of these legal 
doctrines.  Demonstrating how these various definitions of the term 
immutability derive their definitions from their contexts exposes the 
inherent fallacy of importing definitions of the term immutability 
from other contexts. By noting that immutability’s definition is con-
textual, I point to the final task of this Article:  to provide a definition 
of immutability that coheres with the core principles of the Equal 
Protection Clause. 
Taking up this project in Part VI, I begin by harkening back to the 
Supreme Court’s initial articulation of the immutability factor in Fron-
tiero v. Richardson.45  With our newfound emphasis on context, it is not 
surprising that the Supreme Court crafted its unique understanding 
of immutability for the equal protection context in its initial articula-
tion of the factor, describing the term as referring to accidents of 
birth.  It is this definition of immutability, focused on entrance into 
the classification, that coheres with the process-based understanding 
of the Equal Protection Clause underpinning the tiers of scrutiny ap-
proach currently employed in suspect classification analysis.  In ask-
ing if a trait is an accident of birth, courts are able to successfully use 
immutability as a proxy to determine whether a particular trait is re-
levant to the statute or governmental policy in question.  In contrast, 
I argue that the other definitions of immutability—whether or not an 
individual can or should be required to change a trait and whether 
an individual has control over a trait—accord with the overall pur-
poses of other areas of law, such as asylum and Title VII law respec-
tively. 
In Part VII, I explore how this definition of the immutability fac-
tor obviates much of the criticism leveled against its use in suspect-
classification analysis.  In turn, I reconnect immutability to its con-
 
Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976) (same).  These indicia continue to be employed 
by the Federal Courts of Appeals.  For cases illustrative of this principle, see Sonnier v. 
Quarterman, 476 F.3d 349, 368 n.17 (5th Cir. 2007); Citizens Awareness Network, Inc. v. 
United States, 391 F.3d 338, 354 (1st Cir. 2004); Gary v. City of Warner Robins, 311 F.3d 
1334, 1337 n.6 (11th Cir. 2002); Save Palisade FruitLands v. Todd, 279 F.3d 1204, 1210 
(10th Cir. 2002); Miller v. United States, 73 F.3d 878, 881 (9th Cir. 1995). 
 45 411 U.S. 677, 686–87 (1973). 
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text, providing an account of how the Court’s definition of the term 
fits with the overall process-based scheme of the Equal Protection 
Clause.  Finally, in Part VIII, I consider how this new understanding 
of the immutability factor frames the debate over same-sex marriage 
by changing the way we evaluate whether sexual preference should be 
considered a suspect classification. 
I.  REVISITING THE CANNON:  SUSPECT CLASSIFICATIONS AS DEMOCRACY 
ENHANCING46 
In many ways, the story of suspect classifications begins with age-
old concerns regarding the “countermajoritarian difficulty.”47  At its 
core, the countermajoritarian difficulty is meant to engage “the prob-
lem of justifying the exercise of judicial review by unelected and os-
tensibly unaccountable judges in what we otherwise deem to be a po-
litical democracy.”48  In the context of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
the answer has been to revisit the way in which the Equal Protection 
Clause can be construed as a democracy-enhancing principle, one 
that focuses on the way in which judicial review can explore and rec-
tify the potential pitfalls of an unbridled democratic system.49  Thus, 
one concern regarding democracy left unchecked is the potential 
that certain minority groups will simply not be represented in the 
democratic process; moreover, the majority might impose severe 
 
 46 For a similar discussion as that found below and in Part II, see Michael A. Helfand, How 
the Diversity Rationale Lays the Groundwork for New Discrimination:  Examining the Trajectory of 
Equal Protection Doctrine, 17 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 607, 614–18 (2009). 
 47 This term was famously coined by Alexander Bickel in ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST 
DANGEROUS BRANCH:  THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16 (1962).  For a 
comprehensive review and analysis of the history of the countermajoritarian difficulty, see 
Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part One:  The Road to Judi-
cial Supremacy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 333 (1998); Barry Friedman, The History of the Counterma-
joritarian Difficulty, Part II:  Reconstruction’s Political Court, 91 GEO. L.J. 1 (2002); Barry 
Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Three:  The Lesson of Lochner, 
76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1383 (2001); Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Diffi-
culty, Part Four:  Law’s Politics, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 971 (2000); Barry Friedman, The Birth of 
an Academic Obsession:  The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE 
L.J. 153 (2002) [hereinafter Friedman, Countermajoritarian, Part Five].  For additional au-
thority, see BRUCE ACKERMAN, 1 WE THE PEOPLE:  FOUNDATIONS (1991); BRUCE 
ACKERMAN, 2 WE THE PEOPLE:  TRANSFORMATIONS (1998); Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Lev-
inson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 87 VA. L. REV. 1045 (2001); Steven G. 
Calabresi, Textualism and the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1373 
(1998); Ilya Somin, Political Ignorance and the Countermajoritarian Difficulty:  A New Perspec-
tive on the Central Obsession of Constitutional Theory, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1287 (2004); Mark 
Tushnet, Policy Distortion and Democratic Debilitation:  Comparative Illumination of the Coun-
termajoritarian Difficulty, 94 MICH. L. REV. 245 (1995). 
 48 See Friedman, Countermajoritarian, Part Five, supra note 47, at 155. 
 49 This was most famously the aim of ELY, supra note 3, at 135–79. 
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harms and restrictions on a particular minority group given the po-
tential for festering animus towards that group.  Indeed, this concern 
is as old as the Constitution itself.50 
Construing the Equal Protection Clause as an answer to the coun-
termajoritarian difficulty begins with footnote four in United States v. 
Carolene Products Co.51  On the Court’s analysis, “discrete and insular 
minorities may be a special condition,” where legislation directed at 
such minorities should be scrutinized under the Fourteenth 
Amendment in order to insure that legislation does not “curtail the 
operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to 
protect minorities.”52  In Carolene Products, the Court also gave some 
examples of what it might mean to be a “discrete and insular minor-
ity”:  religious, national and racial minorities.53 
By sorting out particular minorities as worthy of particular protec-
tions, the Court both emphasized the potential problems of unbri-
dled democracy and its potential solution.  Using the Equal Protec-
tion Clause to subject certain legislation to “more searching judicial 
inquiry”54 could fend off any legislative initiatives on the part of the 
majority intended to politically debilitate minorities from getting a 
fair shake in the political arena. 
But this is all quite vague.  The Court’s first foray into some scru-
tiny-based approach to the countermajoritarian difficulty left two 
questions unanswered.  First, what were the criteria for inclusion into 
the category of “discrete and insular minorities;” second, what would 
the contours of a scrutiny doctrine look like?  It is into this vacuum 
that the now well-rehearsed suspect classification and strict scrutiny 
doctrines have been introduced. 
 
 50 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 40 (James Madison) (Terence Ball ed., Cambridge Univ. 
Press 2003) (noting that “measures are too often decided, not according to the rules of 
justice, and the rights of the minor party; but by the superior force of an interested and 
over-bearing majority”). 
 51 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).  This is not to say that such reasoning is correct, only that it 
is the route most typically traveled.  Indeed, the Court has repeatedly referenced footnote 
four in many of its Equal Protection cases.  See Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 
200, 218 (1995) (citing footnote four of Carolene Products); City of Richmond v. J. A. Cro-
son Co., 488 U.S. 469, 495 (1989) (same); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 
288 (1978) (same); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (same).  However, 
Bruce Ackerman has famously argued that the “discrete and insular minority” analysis in 
footnote four ignores the more precarious position of “anonymous and diffuse” groups.  
See Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713, 724 (1985). 
 52 Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 153 n.4. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Id. 
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II.  SUSPECT CLASSIFICATIONS AND STRICT SCRUTINY:  THE PROCESS-
BASED UNDERSTANDING 
On the canonical story we have been recounting thus far, the doc-
trinal innovation of strict scrutiny links up directly with footnote four 
in Carolene Products.55  It is on this account that the Court has de-
scribed strict scrutiny as a tool “to ‘smoke out’ illegitimate uses of 
race by assuring that the legislative body is pursuing a goal important 
enough to warrant use of a highly suspect tool.”56  In other words, 
 
 55 I refer here to the process-based understanding of the Equal Protection Clause as “ca-
nonical” not because it is a universally accepted framework to understand the Equal Pro-
tection Clause.  To the contrary, scholars and judges continue to debate the merit of 
other interpretive paradigms as applied to the Equal Protection Clause.  Most notably, 
there has been ample debate over the coherence of originalism as applied to the Equal 
Protection Clause.  For a discussion along these lines, see ROBERT H. BORK, THE 
TEMPTING OF AMERICA:  THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW (1990); Robert H. Bork, 
Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 14 (1971); Michael W. 
McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 947 (1995).  In this 
Article, I do not attempt to resolve this debate besides to note some of originalism’s most 
formidable critics.  For such critiques, see Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original 
Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204 (1980); Ronald Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, 56 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 469 (1981); Sanford Levinson, Law as Literature, 60 TEX. L. REV. 373 
(1982); Michael J. Perry, The Legitimacy of Particular Conceptions of Constitutional Interpreta-
tion, 77 VA. L. REV. 669 (1991); Richard A. Posner, Bork and Beethoven, 42 STAN. L. REV. 
1365 (1990); Jed Rubenfeld, Affirmative Action, 107 YALE L.J. 427 (1997); Mark V. Tushnet, 
Following the Rules Laid Down:  A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. 
REV. 781 (1983). 
   Instead, when I describe the canonical account of the Equal Protection Clause as 
process-based, I mean to express my own view that the dominant account that has ani-
mated the Supreme Court’s majority decisions regarding the Equal Protection Clause are 
best described as grounded in a process-based theory.  Of course, individual justices have 
expressed their own affinities for originalism.  See Melissa L. Saunders, Equal Protection, 
Class Legislation, and Colorblindness, 96 MICH. L. REV. 245, 328–29 n.365 (1997) (recount-
ing the affinities for originalism of various Supreme Court justices).  But here, I try to 
present the dominant theory that explains the Court’s decision.  It is of this fact I hope 
to, among other arguments, convince the reader in this Article.  In turn, many of the 
proceeding arguments are built off of this process-based theory.  In this way, the conclu-
sions of this Article are predicated on my view that a process-based theory, for the most 
part, has animated the Court’s Equal Protection decisions. 
 56 J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. at 493.  Jed Rubenfeld, however, has noted that the Supreme 
Court has advanced two conflicted views regarding the purpose of strict scrutiny.  See Ru-
benfeld, supra note 55, at 428 (describing the shift in strict scrutiny).  While on the one 
hand the Court often emphasizes the way in which strict scrutiny can smoke out illegiti-
mate purposes, it has also stated that strict scrutiny ensures that the goal being pursued is 
important enough to justify the prima facie equal protection violation.  Cf. Korematsu v. 
United States, 323 U.S. 214, 219–20 (1944).  Rubenfeld is critical of this second approach 
to strict scrutiny in part because he understands rights as being the type of legal mecha-
nism whose violation cannot be justified.  Moreover, the implications of the justificatory 
account do not, in Rubenfeld’s view, cohere with the multiple tiers of scrutiny invoked by 
the court.  See generally Rubenfeld, supra note 55, at 428.  For a response, see Helfand, su-
pra note 46. 
Oct. 2009] SUSPECT CLASSIFICATIONS 15 
 
strict scrutiny is used to investigate whether legislation containing a 
suspect classification on its face does in fact violate the Equal Protec-
tion Clause.  In doing so, it unmasks invidious legislation as enact-
ments of the majority intended to harm a discrete and insular minor-
ity.  But who qualifies as a discrete and insular minority?  On the 
canonical account, groups that evidence a likelihood to fall victim to 
majoritarian politics are included; and it is these groups that are 
deemed protected groups whose classifications are considered sus-
pect. 
It is thus unsurprising that at the core of the Supreme Court’s 
case law determining which classifications are suspect, we find the fol-
lowing “traditional indicia of suspectness:  the class is . . . saddled with 
such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal 
treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as 
to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political 
process.”57  Thus, either past history or current political demograph-
ics give us good reason to believe that certain protected classes have 
not been appropriately represented in the political arena; in turn, 
animus, and not deliberation, may serve as the motivation driving a 
particular suspect classification on the face of a given piece of legisla-
tion.58 
But the purely process-based story cannot account for all the sus-
pect classification criteria.  Indeed, the Court, in Frontiero v. Richard-
son announced another set of criteria for qualifying to be a suspect 
classification: 
Moreover, since sex, like race and national origin, is an immutable 
characteristic determined solely by the accident of birth, the imposition 
of special disabilities upon the members of a particular sex because of 
their sex would seem to violate ‘the basic concept of our system that legal 
burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibility . . . .’  
And what differentiates sex from such nonsuspect statuses as intelligence 
or physical disability, and aligns it with the recognized suspect criteria, is 
that the sex characteristic frequently bears no relation to ability to per-
form or contribute to society.  As a result, statutory distinctions between 
the sexes often have the effect of invidiously relegating the entire class of 
 
 57 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973); see also City of Cle-
burne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 441 (1985); Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 
U.S. 307, 313 (1976); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 n.17 (1973). 
 58 Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216 (“[A]ll legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single 
racial group are immediately suspect.  That is not to say that all such restrictions are un-
constitutional.  It is to say that courts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny.  Press-
ing public necessity may sometimes justify the existence of such restrictions; racial an-
tagonism never can.”). 
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females to inferior legal status without regard to the actual capabilities of 
its individual members.59 
This statement by the Court is deeply puzzling.  If we construct sus-
pect classifications because we are concerned about the ability of par-
ticular groups to participate in the democratic process, why include 
immutability on the list of criteria?  It seemingly has no relationship 
to our process-based account.  At first glance, it is hard to envision 
why a group having an immutable trait makes them more likely to be 
left out—or discriminated against—by the majority through the po-
litical system; put another way, why should a group with an immuta-
ble trait be considered more “discrete and insular”?  This tension—
what we might call the immutability problem—has occupied a wide 
range of scholars, intent on unpacking the rationale behind using 
immutability as a factor in equal protection analysis.60  We will turn to 
some of these suggestions shortly. 
To be sure, it is not only in the secondary literature that we find 
some uneasiness regarding immutability.  The Supreme Court itself 
has backed off on applying the immutability factor in a number of 
cases; indeed, it seems most accurate to say that the Court’s articulat-
ing of the immutability factor was done haltingly.  Consider the fol-
lowing.  The immutability factor was announced in Frontiero v. Rich-
ardson, a case decided on May 14, 1973.61  Interestingly, the Court 
decided another equal protection case two months earlier—San An-
tonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez—a case that considered 
whether wealth discrimination constituted a classification of a pro-
tected class.62  One of the holdings of the case was that wealth classifi-
cations are not subjected to strict scrutiny because they do not consti-
tute discrimination against a suspect class.63  In light of the reasoning 
soon to be announced in Frontiero, we might have expected the Court 
to trumpet the fact that wealth discrimination is not an immutable 
characteristic, thus bolstering the Court’s contention that it is not a 
suspect class.64  Indeed, such an argument would have fit perfectly 
with the primary holding of the case.  And yet, the Court completely 
 
 59 Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686–87 (internal citations and footnotes omitted). 
 60 See, e.g., ELY, supra note 3, at 150; Halley, supra note 3; Richards, supra note 41 at 501–08; 
Yoshino, supra note 3. 
 61 See Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686–87. 
 62 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
 63 Id. at 28. 
 64 Indeed, the Ninth Circuit, in addressing a statute criminalizing homelessness, has noted 
that homelessness is not immutable.  See Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 444 F.3d 1118, 1137 
(9th Cir. 2006). 
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ignored immutability, focusing instead solely on the lack of the “tra-
ditional” process-based criteria for suspect classification.65 
There have been other important instances where the Court has 
ignored the immutability factor in deciding whether a particular 
group ought to be considered a suspect class.  In Massachusetts Board 
of Retirement v. Murgia, the Court considered whether the elderly 
should be deemed a suspect classification.66  Like in San Antonio Inde-
pendent School District, the Court refused to expand the list of suspect 
classes.67  And, like in San Antonio Independent School District, the Court 
ignored the immutability factor in its analysis.68  While deciding how 
to apply immutability to age is far from a simply matter, one would 
have expected some discussion of the factor by the Court. 
Even more notable is that the Court, at times, has explicitly ques-
tioned whether immutability ought to remain a factor in compiling a 
list of suspect classes.  In City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, the 
Court addressed whether a zoning ordinance prohibiting a home for 
the “mentally retarded” violated the Equal Protection Clause.69  The 
first step of such an analysis required determining whether the men-
tally retarded should be deemed a suspect class.70  The Court’s analy-
sis noted, in passing, that mental retardation was an immutable char-
acteristic, but such a characteristic was still a legitimate consideration 
of the zoning ordinance:  “[the mentally retarded] are thus different, 
immutably so, in relevant respects, and the States’ interest in dealing 
with and providing for them is plainly a legitimate one.”71  In justify-
ing this proposition, the Court cited John Hart Ely’s attack on the 
immutability factor, noting its irrelevance to the process-based para-
digm of suspect classes.72  It is difficult to see the Court’s analysis and 
citation as evincing anything but an extraordinary lack of comfort 
with the immutability factor. 
Lower courts, in dealing with similar equal protection claims to 
suspect status, have taken note of the Court’s ambivalence towards 
the immutability factor.73  For example, Judge Norris’s concurrence 
 
 65 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973). 
 66 427 U.S. 307 (1976). 
 67 Id. at 312–14. 
 68 Id. 
 69 473 U.S. 432 (1985). 
 70 Id. at 439–47. 
 71 Id. at 442. 
 72 Id. at 442–43 n.10. 
 73 See Able v. United States, 968 F. Supp. 850, 863 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (citing Cleburne and not-
ing that “[i]mmutability is merely one of several possible indications that a classification is 
likely to reflect prejudice.  Indeed, though alienage is not immutable, aliens are accorded 
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in the Ninth Circuit’s Watkins v. United States Army expresses serious 
ambivalence in considering whether immutability is relevant to equal 
protection analysis, noting that the Court has both at times cast doubt 
on using the immutability factor74 and at times simply refrained from 
doing so itself.75  As Judge Norris makes clear, immutability’s place in 
equal protection doctrine is unstable, primarily because its relation-
ship to the process-based core of the suspect classification doctrine 
remains unresolved.76 
III.  ASSESSING THE PROCESS-PLUS-IMMUTABILITY PARADIGM:  THE 
CRIMINAL PROBLEM 
Much of the problem with immutability stems from the lack of a 
legal definition or defined role.  Courts and scholars typically have 
understood an immutable trait to refer to a trait that cannot be 
changed.77  Unfortunately, given prior application of the immutability 
 
heightened scrutiny”), rev’d on other grounds, 155 F.3d 628 (2d Cir. 1998); Equal. Found. 
of Greater Cincinnati, Inc., v. City of Cincinnati, 860 F. Supp. 417, 434 n.13 (S.D. Ohio 
1994) (recognizing “that the Supreme Court has demonstrated some skepticism as to the 
relevance of the immutability factor”), rev’d, 54 F.3d 261 (6th Cir. 1995), vacated, 518 U.S. 
1001 (1996), reinstated on reh’g, 128 F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 1997); Jantz v. Muci, 759 F. Supp. 
1543, 1548 n.5 (D. Kan. 1991) (noting that the Supreme Court has refrained from apply-
ing the immutability factor on a number of occasions), rev’d, 976 F.2d 623 (10th Cir. 
1992). 
 74 875 F.2d 699, 725–26 (9th Cir. 1989) (Norris, J., concurring). 
 75 Id. 
 76 Id. 
 77 See Startzell v. City of Philadelphia, No. 05-05287, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34128, at *20 n.9 
(E.D. Pa. May 26, 2006) (concluding that characteristics such as a person’s religion are 
not immutable and defining immutability:  “not subject to or susceptible of change; un-
changeable, unalterable, changeless” (internal quotation marks omitted)) (quoting 
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989)); A.G.G. Enters. v. Washington County, 145 
F. Supp. 2d 1215, 1227 (D. Or. 2001) (arguing that the trait in question was not immuta-
ble because it was subject to change); D’Amario v. Russo, 718 F. Supp. 118, 123 (D.R.I. 
1989) (defining immutable as “not capable of change”); Tanner v. Oregon Health Scis. 
Univ., 157 Or. App. 502, 522 (Or. Ct. App. 1998); Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 892–93 
(Vt. 1999) (Dooley, J., concurring); Miriam J. Aukerman, The Somewhat Suspect Class:  To-
wards a Constitutional Framework for Evaluating Occupational Restrictions Affecting People with 
Criminal Records, 7 J.L. SOC’Y 18, 59 (2005) (“Immutability should be distinguished from 
the related concept of accountability which addresses whether the individual acquired 
the characteristic as a result of his or her own choices.”); Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gu-
lati, The Fifth Black Woman, 11 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 701, 723 (2001) (noting that 
“[o]ne difficulty with th[e] argument is that ‘performance’ is not an immutable charac-
teristic.  It is, by definition, changeable.”); Pamela J. Smith, Part I—Romantic Paternalism—
The Ties That Bind Also Free:  Revealing the Contours of Judicial Affinity for White Women, 3 J. 
GENDER RACE & JUST. 107, 170-71 (1999) (“The general definitions support this type of 
use.  For instance, Webster’s Dictionary defines an immutable characteristic as that which is 
‘unchangeable; unalterable; changeless.’”); Patricia Stirling, The Use of Trade Sanctions as 
an Enforcement Mechanism for Basic Human Rights:  A Proposal for Addition to the World Trade 
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factor, “cannot” may not be understood in the strictest sense.  If im-
mutability is taken to mean an inability to exit, then application of 
the immutability factor must center on what it might mean to be un-
able to change a characteristic.  For example, sex is considered im-
mutable,78 and yet it can most definitely be changed.79  This has led 
some courts and scholars to modify the definition of immutability, 
arguing that a trait is immutable when it is either too difficult to 
change the trait or when the trait is too valuable to expect change.  
But this just raises further questions:  for instance, how difficult is dif-
ficult?  Unsurprisingly, courts80 and scholars81 alike have struggled to 
answer this type of question. 
 
Organization, 11 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 1, 10 (1996) (stating “the definition of an im-
mutable characteristic is one that is unchangeable”); Gabriella A. Davi, Note, A Progression 
Towards Freedom:  Protecting the Disabled Under the Ku Klux Klan Act, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 
1019, 1020 n.9 (1999) (noting that “Webster’s Dictionary defines immutable as ‘not capable 
or susceptible of change’” (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 
OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED 1131 (3d ed. 1986)); Ben Geiger, Note, The Case 
for Treating Ex-Offenders as a Suspect Class, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1191, 1211 (2006) (discussing 
Frontiero and noting that the “dictionary definition of immutable is ‘not capable or sus-
ceptible of change: invariable, unalterable’”); Steven M. Ziolkowski, Note, The Status of 
Weight-Based Employment Discrimination Under the Americans with Disabilities Act After Cook v. 
Rhode Island Department of Mental Health, Retardation, and Hospitals, 74 B.U. L. REV. 
667, 678 n.70 (1994) (stating that “[a] condition is ‘immutable’ if it cannot be relieved”). 
   There have been some cases that argue immutability cannot apply to cases where the 
trait is behavioral in nature.  See, e.g., High Tech Gays v. Def. Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 
895 F.2d 563, 573 (9th Cir. 1990); Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068, 1076 (Fed. 
Cir. 1989).  It is not clear if they are working with a different definition of immutability 
which precludes conduct-based traits from being deemed immutable, or if it is simply a 
separate doctrinal side constraint.  At least one author has suggested that these cases rep-
resent a category of “passive immutability,” which requires that the immutable trait be 
something that can be developed without action.  On this account, “passive immutability” 
is meant to be differentiated from a trait that simply cannot be changed.  See Chai R. 
Feldblum, Sexual Orientation, Morality, and the Law:  Devlin Revisited, 57 U. PITT. L. REV. 
237, 242 (1996) (distinguishing “passive” immutability”). 
 78 Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (“[S]ex . . . is an immutable character-
istic determined solely by the accident of birth . . . .”). 
 79 Stein, supra note 41, at 70 (arguing the immutability factor is selectively applied, as sex is 
considered a suspect classification, yet it can be changed).  But see Littleton v. Prange, 9 
S.W.3d 223, 230 (Tex. App. 1999) (concluding that sex is a characteristic that, for legal 
purposes, is fixed at birth). 
 80 Consider the following analysis presented by the Ninth Circuit in Watkins v. United States 
Army, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989): 
It is clear that by “immutability” the Court has never meant strict immutability in 
the sense that members of the class must be physically unable to change or mask 
the trait defining their class.  People can have operations to change their sex.  
Aliens can ordinarily become naturalized citizens.  The status of illegitimate chil-
dren can be changed.  People can frequently hide their national origin by chang-
ing their customs, their names, or their associations.  Lighter skinned blacks can 
sometimes “pass” for white, as can Latinos for Anglos, and some people can even 
change their racial appearance with pigment injections.  At a minimum, then, the 
Supreme Court is willing to treat a trait as effectively immutable if changing it 
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Indeed if our analysis were to stop here, we should pause and 
wonder whether immutability, on this account, can be a useful doc-
trinal tool.  For example, is being a baseball player truly immutable?  
Some people just could not hold any job except the one they have—
or at least so they think.  How about being Christian?  Can religionists 
really see themselves as simply converting?82  This type of analysis 
forces judges down into the murky waters of political philosophy and 
psychology.83  Such a construction of immutability almost defies ap-
plication. 
 
would involve great difficulty, such as requiring a major physical change or a 
traumatic change of identity.  Reading the case law in a more capacious manner, 
“immutability” may describe those traits that are so central to a person’s identity 
that it would be abhorrent for government to penalize a person for refusing to 
change them, regardless of how easy that change might be physically.  Racial dis-
crimination, for example, would not suddenly become constitutional if medical 
science developed an easy, cheap, and painless method of changing one’s skin 
pigment. 
   Id. at 726 (internal citation omitted). 
 81 See Marcosson, supra note 4, at 653 (“This in turn raises the immediate question:  what 
constitutes a ‘substantial’ cost or difficulty, sufficient to render the characteristic substan-
tially immutable?”); Shapiro, supra note 3, at 412 (“Given immutability’s problematic na-
ture, the Court should explicitly adopt the ‘effective immutability’ approach of Judge Wil-
liam Norris in Watkins.”).  This type of analysis, in turn, leads to peculiar questions about 
the potential immutability of all sorts of human characteristics.  See, e.g., Antonio J. Califa, 
Declaring English the Official Language:  Prejudice Spoken Here, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 293, 
334–35 n.262 (1989) (arguing that the in fact obstacles to learning a new language justify 
the conclusion that foreign language speakers ought to constitute a protected class); Eliz-
abeth Kristin, Comment, Addressing the Problem of Weight Discrimination in Employment, 90 
CAL. L. REV. 57, 71 (2002) (“I assume that to be fat is not necessarily unhealthy and that 
weight is either immutable or so difficult or dangerous to permanently change as to be 
practically immutable.”). 
 82 See, e.g., Holmes v. Cal. Army Nat’l Guard, 124 F.3d 1126, 1137 (9th Cir. 1997) (Rein-
hardt, J., dissenting) (arguing that “there is no more justification for discrimination 
against individuals because of their sexual orientation, which is most frequently a hap-
penstance of birth, than there is for discrimination against blacks, Hispanics or Asians—
or against Catholics, Jews, or Muslims, who at least have the option to convert”).  As a 
rule, few courts have considered whether religion is a suspect classification because such 
claims are typically subsumed under First Amendment doctrine.  See Yoshino, supra note 
3, at 495 n.33 (“The existence of the First Amendment has generally prevented courts 
from entertaining the claim that religious classifications deserve heightened scrutiny.”); 
Benjamin Hoorn Barton, Note, Religion-Based Peremptory Challenges After Batson v. Ken-
tucky and J.E.B. v. Alabama:  An Equal Protection and First Amendment Analysis, 94 MICH. L. 
REV. 191, 204 (1995). 
 83 See, e.g., Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571, 614–16 (Md. 2007) (citing to a variety of con-
flicting psychological and biological studies regarding the immutability of homosexuality, 
but concluding that no studies could be considered by the court because they did not sat-
isfy any of the evidentiary standards for admissibility of scientific evidence); Dean v. Dis-
trict of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307, 330–31 (D.C. 1995) (explaining that although some 
might argue the judicial context is not the appropriate context for fact-finding regarding 
“the nature and causes of homosexuality,” the court would make such findings upon fur-
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However, if scanning the secondary literature is any indication, 
the most formidable problems posed by immutability to equal protec-
tion doctrine do not stem from such slippery slope arguments; more 
often that not, scholars point to the fact that it is far from clear what 
role immutability is meant to play in determining whether a particu-
lar classification should be deemed suspect.  Indeed, a number of 
scholars have noted that immutability is neither a necessary nor suffi-
cient criterion for deciding whether to deem a particular classifica-
tion suspect.84  Thus, they argue that the disabled, for example, are a 
class with an immutable trait yet are not considered suspect,85 while 
alienage is not an immutable trait yet alienage is a suspect classifica-
tion.86  The fact that immutability is neither a necessary nor sufficient 
criterion for suspect classification status inevitably gives rise to ques-
tions about whether immutability is doing any doctrinal work that ac-
tually serves the overall purpose of the Equal Protection Clause.87 
 
ther presentations by the party, in reliance “not only on case law but also on scientific and 
social science sources proffered by the parties—and found on [the court’s] own”). 
   This debate has also, to some extent, been one of the preoccupations of recent con-
temporary theory.  Unsurprisingly, no decisive blows have been landed.  For an overview, 
see SEYLA BENHABIB, SITUATING THE SELF:  GENDER, COMMUNITY AND POSTMODERNISM IN 
CONTEMPORARY ETHICS 148–71 (1992); RAINER FORST, CONTEXTS OF JUSTICE:  POLITICAL 
PHILOSOPHY BEYOND LIBERALISM AND COMMUNITARIANISM (John M. M. Farrell trans., 
1994); JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE INCLUSION OF THE OTHER:  STUDIES IN POLITICAL THEORY 
239–52 (2d ed. 1999); AXEL HONNETH, THE STRUGGLE FOR RECOGNITION:  THE MORAL 
GRAMMAR OF SOCIAL CONFLICTS 121–30, 171–79 (Joel Anderson trans., 1995); ALASDAIR 
C. MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE:  A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY (2d ed. 1984); ROBERT NOZICK, 
ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA (1974); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971); CHARLES 
TAYLOR, PHILOSOPHY AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES 187–210 (1985); CHARLES TAYLOR, 
SOURCES OF THE SELF:  THE MAKING OF THE MODERN IDENTITY 185–98, 502–06 (1989); 
Michael Sandel, The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self, 12 POL. THEORY 81 
(1984). 
 84 See Halley, supra note 3, at 966 (describing “the counterfactual assertion that homosexual-
ity . . . is immutable”); Spitko, supra note 3, at 598 (arguing that “immutability of a char-
acteristic is neither a prerequisite to nor a sufficient condition for heightened scrutiny of 
a classification relating to that characteristic”); Cass R. Sunstein, Homosexuality and the 
Constitution, 70 IND. L.J. 1, 9 (1994) (“Mutability, however, is not the decisive factor.”); 
Tribe, supra note 3, at 1073 (“[F]eatures like immutability are neither sufficient nor nec-
essary.” (citations omitted)); see also Olagues v. Russoniello, 797 F.2d 1511, 1520 (9th Cir. 
1986) (“But immutability is not the sole determining factor.  For example, the Supreme 
Court has held that aliens form a suspect class.”). 
 85 See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 442 (1985) (holding that men-
tal retardation is not a quasi-suspect class). 
 86 See, e.g., Tribe, supra note 3, at 1073 n.52 (so noting).  For the proposition that alienage is 
a suspect classification, Tribe cites Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977).  The first Su-
preme Court case announcing alienage as suspect was Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 
(1971).  There is nearly universal agreement among courts and scholars that alienage is 
mutable; however, we will return to the application of immutability to the alienage classi-
fication in Section VI(b). 
 87 See supra note 84. 
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But shuttling immutability from the current paradigm leaves the 
“traditional” process-based indicia as the sole factors to determine 
whether a classification should be considered suspect; such a result 
has its own complicated consequences.  Consider the following:  what 
are we to make of criminals as a suspect classification?  Criminals 
clearly fit all the “traditional indicia of suspectness.”  Historically, they 
have probably been discriminated against more than any other 
group.  And, given, for example, their lack of voting rights during in-
carceration,88 it seems hard to conceive of a group that faces more 
formidable obstacles in trying to participate in the political process. 
Others have noted the problem that criminals pose to process-
based equal protection analysis.89  But courts continue to struggle to 
find reasons why criminals, or people with a criminal record, do not 
constitute a suspect classification.  Some courts, in addressing what 
we might term the “criminal problem,” retreat to precedent:  “The 
Supreme Court has not announced that the status of ‘criminal de-
fendant’ is a suspect classification.”90  Other courts have simply dis-
missed the idea as absurd.91  Still other courts have ignored both 
process-based and immutability factors:  “We can easily see a rationale 
for a policy decision not to hire persons who have been convicted of 
felonies even though they have been pardoned; a person who has 
committed a felony may be thought to lack the qualities of self con-
trol or honesty that this sensitive job requires.”92  And they are willing 
 
 88 For a discussion of criminal disenfranchisement, see Andrew L. Shapiro, Note, Challeng-
ing Criminal Disenfranchisement Under the Voting Rights Act:  A New Strategy, 103 YALE L.J. 537 
(1993). 
 89 See, e.g., Tribe, supra note 3, at 1075.  See generally Aukerman, supra note 77, at 51–66 (con-
sidering the applicability of suspect status to criminals). 
 90 Virgin Islands v. Hodge, 359 F.3d 312, 326 (3d Cir. 2004); see also Baer v. City of Wauwa-
tosa, 716 F.2d 1117, 1125 (7th Cir. 1983) (“[F]elons are not yet a protected class under 
the Fourteenth Amendment.”); Miller v. Carter, 547 F.2d 1314, 1320 (7th Cir. 1977) 
(Campbell, J., concurring) (same); Watson v. Cronin, 384 F. Supp. 652, 659 (D. Colo. 
1974) (“[S]uch a classification has not as yet been held suspect.”); Butts v. Nichols, 381 F. 
Supp. 573, 579 (S.D. Iowa 1974) (same). 
 91 Moss v. Clark, 886 F.2d 686, 690 (4th Cir. 1989) (“Moreover, it would be ironic for the law 
to confer special solicitude upon a class whose members had violated it.”); Ransom v. 
Wainwright, 553 F.2d 900, 901 (5th Cir. 1977) (“If it is an attempt to assert that the stat-
ute infringes equal protection by creating an invidious class—felons—who are forbidden 
to carry firearms, the argument is without merit.”); see also Zipkin v. Heckler, 790 F.2d 16, 
18 (2d Cir. 1986) (dismissing the possibility without analysis); Furst v. N.Y. City Transit 
Auth., 631 F. Supp. 1331, 1336 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (same); Greenwell v. Walters, 596 F. 
Supp. 693, 695 (M.D. Tenn. 1984) (same); Kindem v. Alameda, 502 F. Supp. 1108, 1111 
(N.D. Cal. 1980) (same). 
 92 Upshaw v. McNamara, 435 F.2d 1188, 1190 (1st Cir. 1970) (concerning police appoint-
ment).  To be sure, Upshaw was decided before Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 
(1973). 
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to do so even as they readily admit that the right to vote has been de-
nied to felons, leaving felons as the ultimate political process outsid-
ers.93 
Indeed, Laurence Tribe believes the criminal problem demon-
strates that the process-based view cannot guide equal protection 
doctrine: 
Burglars are subject to widespread hostility:  indeed, the activity that de-
fines the group is everywhere legislatively prohibited.  Are burglars there-
fore a “suspect class”?  Of course not.  Suspect status is unthinkable—but 
only because of the substantive value we attach to personal security, and 
the importance for us of the system of private property and its rules of 
transfer, which the burglary prohibition preserves.94 
The Court, most explicitly in Frontiero, believed that introducing the 
immutability factor into suspect classification analysis would help en-
sure that statutes and regulations would impose “legal burdens” only 
on classifications that bore some relationship to “individual responsi-
bility.”95  And yet, despite that fact, the immutability factor does not 
appear to provide any leverage in addressing the criminal problem. 
Indeed, it is far from clear how to apply the immutability factor to 
claims on behalf of criminals who seek suspect classification status de-
spite the fact that it would seem that criminals are the class most wor-
thy of having legal burdens imposed upon them.  If we define “being 
a criminal” as “having committed a crime,” then the character trait of 
being a criminal is immutable.  We might, however, argue that peo-
ple no longer incarcerated are ex-convicts; that is, they are no longer 
criminals.  But what about having a criminal record?  On the immu-
tability-as-exit view, having a criminal record is immutable.  And, 
given our earlier comments about how criminals fare when evaluated 
on process grounds, it seems as if the class of people with a criminal 
record would be a protected class and all enactments using such a 
classification would be subject to strict scrutiny.  Maybe, on this ac-
count, we should subject all treatment of ex-convicts on parole, for 
example, to strict scrutiny.  Indeed, some scholars have advocated 
such or similar approaches.96 
 
 93 Id.; see also Greenwell, 596 F. Supp. at 695 (reiterating the plaintiff’s argument that “prison-
ers are entitled to the intermediate level of review because they are politically power-
less”). 
 94 Tribe, supra note 3, at 1075. 
 95 Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686–87. 
 96 See, e.g., Aukerman, supra note 77, at 85 (arguing that “courts should recognize that peo-
ple with criminal records, like traditional suspect classes, lack political power and have 
suffered a history of discrimination”); Geiger, supra note 77, at 1192 (stating that bases 
for denying ex-offenders suspect classification standing does not survive analytical scru-
tiny). 
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But this seems deeply troubling.  Could it be that classifications of 
ex-convicts (strict scrutiny) should be subjected to higher scrutiny 
than sex-based classifications (intermediate scrutiny)?  And yet, on 
the process-plus-immutability paradigm we have no doctrinal tools in 
our legal quiver to strike down such a conclusion. 
Indeed, the fact that immutability both does little to eliminate 
troubling classes from consideration for suspect status and does not 
cohere in any obvious way with the process paradigm, brings its inclu-
sion as a factor in equal protection analysis into question.  And it is 
this puzzling dynamic that has attracted the attention of scholars hop-
ing to make sense of the factors used by the court to determine which 
classes ought to be considered suspect. 
IV.  RECONSIDERING THE PROCESS-PLUS-IMMUTABILITY PARADIGM:  
RESPONSES IN THE SECONDARY LITERATURE 
The tensions between the process-based approach to suspect clas-
sifications and the immutability factor have not gone unnoticed.  In 
fact, the perceived irreconcilability of these two concepts has led to 
the near universal derision of immutability as a useful mechanism for 
approaching the construction of protected classes.97  One recent 
scholar has described critiquing immutability as “flog[ging] a dying 
horse.”98  Unsurprisingly, this deep skepticism that immutability has 
anything to offer informs the various approaches taken by scholars 
hoping to address how we should understand immutability. 
The ambassador of the pure process-based interpretation of the 
Equal Protection Clause—John Hart Ely—has simply bit the prover-
bial bullet in analyzing the process-plus-immutability paradigm.  On 
the one hand, Ely argues that immutability is irrelevant to determin-
ing which classes ought to be deemed suspect: 
[N]o one has bothered to build the logical bridge, to tell us exactly why 
we should be suspicious of legislatures that classify on the basis of immu-
table characteristics.  Surely one has to feel sorry for a person disabled by 
something he or she can’t do anything about, but I’m not aware of any 
reason to suppose that elected officials are unusually unlikely to share 
that feeling. Moreover, classifications based on physical disability and in-
telligence are typically accepted as legitimate, even by judges and com-
mentators who assert that immutability is relevant. The explanation, 
when one is given, is that those characteristics (unlike the one the com-
mentator is trying to render suspect) are often relevant to legitimate 
 
 97 See Marcosson, supra note 4, at 647–48 (noting that “[i]t is difficult to find the last aca-
demic defense of immutability or the last call for stressing it in constitutional litigation”). 
 98 Yoshino, supra note 3, at 491. 
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purposes. At that point there’s not much left of the immutability theory, 
is there?99 
But if, as Ely claims, immutability does not do any actual doctrinal 
work, he must come to grips with the “criminal problem.”  On this 
front, Ely does not disappoint, even if somewhat ambiguously: 
[I]t may help to recall that all that labeling a classification “suspect” 
means functionally is that a prima facie case has been made out and that 
the inquiry into its suspiciousness should continue.  If it turns out directly 
to pursue a substantial goal . . . it will survive.  Thus, for example, bur-
glars are certainly a group toward which there is widespread societal hos-
tility, and laws making burglary a crime certainly do comparatively disad-
vantage burglars.  Such laws plainly should survive, however.100 
This is quite the conclusion.  Ely believes that his process-based ac-
count turns criminals into a suspect classification.  He does, however, 
take the easy case of “laws making burglary a crime,” and concludes 
triumphantly that such laws would survive strict scrutiny.  But what 
about the myriad of other laws that employ criminal classification—
would those obviously survive?  Indeed, the frequency with which 
courts have encountered the question of whether criminals constitute 
a protected class indicates that many laws applied to criminals as a 
group would not survive strict scrutiny.101  Ely might be willing to em-
brace such a conclusion, but I presume that most of us would not.  
Unfortunately, living with criminals as a suspect classification appears 
to be the fate of a pure process-based paradigm. 
Recognizing this problem with a pure process-based paradigm, 
other scholars have sought to introduce, either explicitly or implicitly, 
substantive criteria to a predominantly process-based inquiry.  For 
example, Janet Halley has described her own project as advocating 
“judicial review of substantive legislative choices that impinge on the 
process of majoritarian decisionmaking.”102  Others have sought to 
construct new principles for determining whether a particular gov-
ernmental initiative runs afoul of the Equal Protection Clause by 
eliminating process-based concerns and looking instead to the effects 
of such initiatives on the existent social hierarchy.  Thus the secon-
dary literature is replete with theories that advance principles such as 
 
 99 ELY, supra note 3, at 150.  Much of this critique is cited in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne 
Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 443 n.10 (1985). 
100 ELY, supra note 3, at 154. 
101 See supra notes 89–96 and accompanying text. 
102 Halley, supra note 3, at 965 (adopting First Amendment distinctions between speech and 
conduct in order to determine when interference with legislation on substantive grounds 
is legitimate). 
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“the pariah principle,”103 the “anticaste principle,”104 and the “antidis-
crimination principle.”105  In doing so, such theories give up on the 
process-plus-immutability paradigm, as it is simply not up to the chal-
lenge of addressing the most difficult of equal protection cases.106 
These two extreme theories do share one feature in common:  
they simply eliminate immutability from the equal protection equa-
tion.  Others scholars have attempted to navigate a middle path 
which at least considers the possibility that immutability can be inte-
grated into the process-based paradigm—or at least they have done 
so in order to then critique it.  Such arguments claim that immutable 
groups, unable to extricate themselves from their own suspect class, 
are more likely to face animus in the political process.107  In other 
words, in cases where individuals cannot exit the group classification 
because the classification criterion is immutable—that is, individuals 
cannot change the relevant characteristic—group members are more 
likely to be left out of the political process.  Indeed, as Kenji Yoshino 
has explained in his critique of the immutability factor, “process the-
ory does not ask whether the legislation burdening the indistinct 
group is just or unjust.”108  Instead, it “seeks to discover and protect 
groups that are systematically disempowered in the political proc-
ess.”109  Thus, on the process-based accounts, 
 
103 Farber & Sherry, supra note 8. 
104 Sunstein, supra note 8. 
105 Fiss, supra note 8.  There are still other theories on how we ought to determine which 
classifications should be deemed suspect that look to non process-based criteria in the 
hopes of locating a more stable principle that better coheres with the true impulse driv-
ing the Equal Protection Clause.  See, e.g., Balkin, supra note 8 (arguing that the real ques-
tion for classification ought to be whether the particular characteristic can sustain a stable 
social meaning); Tribe, supra note 3 (arguing that substantive justifications for the sus-
pect classification status lurk behind the standard process-based account); Developments in 
the Law:  Sexual Orientation and the Law, supra note 8 (arguing in favor of granting homo-
sexuality suspect status on multiple grounds including the equal worth of human beings). 
106 This also seems to be the implicit tactic of other theories that eliminate the entire multi-
ple tier framework adopted by the court in order to avoid both procedural and substan-
tive constructions of suspect classifications.  Cf. Goldberg, supra note 8 at 533 (arguing in 
favor of a new context-sensitive test for evaluating potential Equal Protection violations, 
including consideration of “whether the classification reflects disapproval, dislike, or ste-
reotyping of the class”). 
107 For a discussion of this position, see Halley, supra note 3, at 929–33. 
108 Yoshino, supra note 3, at 507; see also Robin Charlow, Judicial Review, Equal Protection and 
the Problem with Plebiscites, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 527, 614 (1994) (“Although this factor is 
sometimes noted, in process terms it serves more as evidence that those with animus can 
readily single out the objects of their hatred and direct their contempt at the chosen par-
ty than as an independent reason for suspending the presumption of constitutionality.”). 
109 Yoshino, supra note 3, at 507. 
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“[Immutability] can be justified by arguing that distinct groups are politi-
cally powerless because, inter alia, they cannot evade discrimination.  
When confronted with discrimination, an indistinct group may temporar-
ily or permanently escape it by changing or hiding its defining trait.  Dis-
tinct groups do not have this chameleon-like ability and are thus subject 
to the full force of discrimination.”110 
But such theories often fail because of the overwhelming number 
of counter-examples.  For example, age and disability are both immu-
table characteristics—once acquired, they are traits that cannot be 
changed—and yet the Supreme Court has explicitly rejected the no-
tion of granting them suspect classification.111  Thus, if the goal of 
such inquiries is to truly uncover new cases of process failure, it is 
hard to see how the immutability factor is a useful doctrinal tool. 
Finally, some scholars argue that immutability is important be-
cause it enables us to determine whether the classification in question 
is in fact relevant for legislative consideration.112  This additional 
prong for granting suspect class status gives us a more complete pic-
ture—or so the argument goes—of whether the characteristic in 
question is legitimate for lawmakers and other government officials 
to consider in their deliberation about and application of the law.  
But pursuing such an explanation requires explaining why courts use 
immutability instead of considering relevance directly.113  While some 
argue that immutability is simply another useful indicator for rele-
vance,114 it seems difficult to believe that no other doctrinal indicators 
would function more predictably. 
In sum, the secondary literature provides little explanation for 
why courts persist in employing the immutability factor within the 
process-based framework of the Equal Protection Clause.  Some scho-
lars suggest that immutability helps us uncover process failures or ir-
relevant legislative consideration, but further examination does not 
bear out their conclusions; immutability, upon initial consideration, 
does not seem to be a doctrinal tool built for such purposes. 
 
110 Id. at 507–08.  To be sure, Yoshino is not only discussing immutability in these passages; 
he is discussing what he terms the “assimilationist bias,” which includes both immutability 
and visibility.  For examples of the Court’s invocation of the visibility factor, see Bowen v. 
Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 602 (1987); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973). 
111 Indeed the existence of counter-examples seems to have guided the Court in not grant-
ing suspect classification status to age and disability.  See Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 
U.S. 307, 313 (1976); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 441 (1985). 
112 See, e.g., Marcosson, supra note 4. 
113 ELY, supra note 3, at 150. 
114 Marcosson, supra note 4. 
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V.  IMMUTABILITY IN CONTEXT:  CONSIDERING IMMUTABLE TRAITS IN 
ASYLUM AND TITLE VII CASES 
It is one of the central claims of this Article that much of the prob-
lem in understanding immutability’s role in equal protection doc-
trine stems from confusion regarding the very definition of the term.  
Courts vary as to whether they understand immutable traits simply as 
traits that the individual cannot change,115 traits over which the indi-
vidual has no control,116 or traits that the individual did not choose.117  
In choosing one definition over the other, courts sometimes simply 
look to a variety of dictionaries.118  On other occasions, and maybe 
even more problematically, courts look to the way in which previous 
courts, addressing the meaning of immutability in other contexts, 
have understood the term.  Indeed, while the immutability factor is 
most well-known for its role in equal protection analysis, immutable 
traits also play a significant role in both asylum and Title VII cases.  
And, as we will see shortly, not only are the roles played by immutabil-
ity in each of these contexts unique, but so are the understood defini-
tions of the term immutability in those contexts.  However, courts, 
addressing equal protection claims frequently borrow definitions 
from these areas of law in their search for an understanding of immu-
tability.  While an understandable tactic—looking to precedent when 
faced with a definitional issue—this inter-doctrinal borrowing poses 
significant problems for understanding the unique role of the immu-
tability in equal protection analysis.  But to understand this problem 
requires first looking at the use of immutability in some of these oth-
er contexts.  This is because the definitions of immutability are con-
text-specific. 
A.  Asylum and Immutability:  Protecting the Persecuted 
The Attorney General has discretion to grant asylum to any indi-
vidual who is a “refugee.”119  The term refugee is statutorily defined as 
an alien “who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or 
unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, [the country 
of removal] because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecu-
tion on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a par-
ticular social group, or political opinion.”120  The definition of the 
 
115 See supra note 17. 
116 See supra note 77. 
117 See supra notes 19 and 75. 
118 See supra note 77. 
119 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A) (2006). 
120 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2006). 
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term “social group” has proven somewhat elusive and continues to be 
a topic of significant debate among circuits,121 scholars,122 and interna-
tional tribunals.123  It is here that immutability has become an impor-
tant factor. 
In its decision in In re Acosta, the Board of Immigration Affairs 
(“BIA”) interpreted “the phrase ‘persecution on account of member-
ship in a particular social group’ to mean persecution that is directed 
toward an individual who is a member of a group of persons all of 
whom share a common, immutable characteristic.”124  In further de-
fining what immutability meant in the asylum context, the BIA stated 
that the “common characteristic that defines the group . . . must be 
one that the members of the group either cannot change, or should 
not be required to change because it is fundamental to their individual 
identities or consciences.”125  The reason the BIA advanced a more 
expansive view of immutability in the asylum context—including also 
traits that individuals “should not be required to change”—stemmed 
from two factors.  First, the BIA interpreted the term “social group” 
in light of the other classifications in the list.126  Thus, political opin-
ion was undoubtedly capable of being changed; in turn, the BIA in-
corporated the term immutability into the definition of social group, 
but in a more expansive sense so as to parallel the other groups listed 
in the asylum statute.127 
But even more importantly, the BIA adopted a more expansive 
conception of immutability to remain in keeping with the principles 
underlying refugee status:  “[b]y construing ‘persecution on account 
 
121 See, e.g., Koudriachova v. Gonzales, 490 F.3d 255, 261 (2d Cir. 2007); Hassan v. Gonzales, 
484 F.3d 513, 517 (8th Cir. 2007); Niang v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d 1187 (10th Cir. 2005); 
Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785, 797 (9th Cir. 2005). 
122 See, e.g., Andrea Binder, Gender and the “Membership in a Particular Social Group” Category of 
the 1951 Refugee Convention, 10 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 167 (2001); Maryellen Fullerton, A 
Comparative Look at Refugee Status Based on Persecution Due to Membership in a Particular Social 
Group, 26 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 505 (1993); Karen Musalo, Revisiting Social Group and Nexus 
in Gender Asylum Claims:  A Unifying Rationale for Evolving Jurisprudence, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 
777 (2003); John Hans Thomas, Seeing Through a Glass, Darkly:  The Social Context of “Par-
ticular Social Groups” in Lwin v. INS, 1999 BYU L. REV. 799 (1999); Ellen Vagelos, The So-
cial Group That Dare Not Speak Its Name:  Should Homosexuals Constitute a Particular Social 
Group for Purposes of Obtaining Refugee Status?  Comment on Re:  Inaudi, 17 FORDHAM INT’L 
L.J. 229 (1993). 
123 See, e.g., UNHCR, Guidelines on International Protection: “Membership of a particular social 
group” within the context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol relating 
to the Status of Refugees, U.N. Doc. HCR/GIP/02/02 (May 7, 2002), available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/3d58de2da.html.  
124 In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985). 
125 Id. (emphasis added). 
126 Id. 
127 Id. 
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of membership in a particular social group’ in this manner, we pre-
serve the concept that refuge is restricted to individuals who are ei-
ther unable by their own actions, or as a matter of conscience should 
not be required, to avoid persecution.”128  Thus, refugees were those 
who were, on some account, deserving of refuge in the United States 
based on the nexus between their fear of persecution and their 
membership in a particular social group.129  As a result, strict immuta-
bility—the ability to in fact change a particular trait—did not capture 
the underlying impulse of asylum.  Only a more expansive under-
standing of immutability—one that also incorporated traits that indi-
viduals “should not be required to change”—captured the purpose of 
asylum law:  “to respond to the urgent needs of persons subject to 
persecution in their homelands, including, where appropri-
ate . . . . admission to this country of refugees of special humanitarian 
concern to the United States.”130 
B.  Title VII and Immutable Traits:  Equal Employment Opportunity 
As with asylum, immutability has been employed as a factor in Ti-
tle VII jurisprudence.  However, in contrast to the asylum context, 
immutability is deployed for purposes of Title VII to capture a very 
different type of organizing principle.  Indeed, while asylum law is 
primarily constructed to advance the needs of persons subject to per-
secution, Title VII doctrine has been built to navigate the “balance 
between employee rights and employer prerogatives.”131  Thus, immu-
tability’s use as a factor in Title VII law stems directly from courts try-
ing to navigate this complex balancing of values.132 
 
128 Id. at 234.  In a recent decision, the BIA affirmed its analysis in In re Acosta.  See In re A-M-
E- & J-G-U-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 69, 73 (B.I.A. 2007).  However, in its decision, the BIA also 
stated “that ‘wealth’ is not an immutable characteristic.  This determination alone, how-
ever, is not dispositive if, for example, the shared characteristic is so fundamental to iden-
tity or conscience that it should not be expected to be changed.”  Id.  In this most recent 
decision, the BIA appears to use immutability in the strict sense.  Thus, even if a trait was 
not immutable, according to the BIA, it could still serve as the basis for membership in a 
“social group” if the trait in question “should not be expected to be changed.”  In this 
truncated statement, the BIA seems to understand traits that are not expected to be 
changed to be mutable, but still potentially sufficient to satisfy the definition of a “social 
group.” 
129 See, e.g., Davila-Mejia v. Mukasey, 531 F.3d 624 (8th Cir. 2008); Vumi v. Gonzales, 502 F.3d 
150 (2d Cir. 2007); see also Michelle Foster, Causation in Context:  Interpreting the Nexus 
Clause in the Refugee Convention, 23 MICH. J. INT’L L. 265 (2002); Musalo, supra note 122. 
130 Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 101, 94 Stat. 102 (1980). 
131 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 239 (1989). 
132 See, e.g., William R. Corbett, The Ugly Truth About Appearance Discrimination and the Beauty of 
Our Employment Discrimination Law, 14 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 153 (2007) (describing 
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The Supreme Court, in its landmark decision Griggs v. Duke Power 
Co., explained that “[t]he objective of Congress in the enactment of 
Title VII . . . was to achieve equality of employment opportunities.”133  
Subsequent to Griggs, the question became how to implement the 
equal-employment-opportunity principle.  The success of implement-
ing the principle hinged on a court’s ability to differentiate between 
legitimate and illegitimate employment criteria. 
The equal-employment-opportunity principle received significant 
attention and explanation in the Court’s McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. 
Green decision.134  In McDonnell Douglas Corp., the Supreme Court 
faced a Title VII claim where the plaintiff alleged his former em-
ployer refused to rehire him on account of race.135  The employer, 
McDonnell Douglas, responded that its refusal to rehire was based 
not upon race, but upon the plaintiff’s participation, arrest, and con-
viction for intentionally obstructing traffic.136  But these were no sim-
ple attempts to obstruct traffic; the plaintiff participated in these so 
called “lock-ins” as part of coordinated civil rights protests.137  And, 
the plaintiff claimed that discriminating against him for his participa-
tion in civil rights protests amounted to employment discrimination 
on the basis of race.138 
In deciding the case in favor of McDonnell Douglas, the Court 
explained why the facts before it differed in an important way from 
the facts of Griggs.  In Griggs, the Court determined that the testing 
device used by the employer had a disparate impact on African Amer-
icans and therefore the use of such testing devices violated the terms 
of Title VII.139  Thus, according to the Court in McDonnell Douglas 
Corp., the Griggs decision “dealt with standardized testing devices 
which, however neutral on their face, operated to exclude many 
blacks who were capable of performing effectively in the desired posi-
tions.”140  As a result, “Griggs was rightly concerned that childhood de-
ficiencies in the education and background of minority citizens, re-
sulting from forces beyond their control, not be allowed to work a 
 
the overall purpose of Title VII as maintaining this balance); Lucille M. Ponte & Jennifer 
L. Gillan, Gender Performance over Job Performance:  Body Art Work Rules and the Continuing 
Subordination of the Feminine, 14 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 319 (2007) (same). 
133 401 U.S. 424, 429–30 (1971). 
134 411 U.S. 792, 806 (1973). 
135 Id. at 796–98. 
136 Id. at 795. 
137 Id. at 794–96. 
138 Id. 
139 See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431–32 (1971). 
140 McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 806. 
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cumulative and invidious burden on such citizens for the remainder 
of their lives.”141  In the case before it, the McDonnell Douglas Corp. 
Court concluded that the “disruptive” acts in question were in fact 
material to job performance and were not beyond the control of the 
employee.142  In this way, the equal-employment-opportunity principle 
linked up with the Court’s emphasis on the employee’s or potential 
employee’s ability to control certain traits or acts.  If an employee ei-
ther chose to act in a certain way or could change a particular trait, 
then the Court would conclude that the individual had an equal op-
portunity to be employed; it was just up to that individual to bring his 
actions and traits into alignment with what the employer wanted. 
Courts have subsequently used the term immutability to capture 
the “beyond control” requirement advanced in McDonnell Douglas 
Corp.  For example, in Willingham v. Macon Telegraph Publishing Co., 
the Fifth Circuit addressed allegations of discriminatory hiring on the 
basis of sex.143  The alleged discrimination was based upon a groom-
ing code which required short hair for men, but not women.144  Alan 
Willingham, the plaintiff, claimed that such a differential policy vio-
lated Title VII.145 
Holding that such requirements did not constitute a violation of 
Title VII, the Fifth Circuit explained that Title VII’s guiding principle 
did not prohibit employers from discriminating on the basis of “cho-
sen” traits:  “[e]qual employment opportunity may be secured only 
when employers are barred from discriminating against employees 
on the basis of immutable characteristics, such as race and national 
origin.”146  This formulation of the immutability factor has subse-
quently appeared in numerous cases and has become the default 
doctrinal view in cases regarding employee dress and grooming 
codes.147 
Indeed, as a notable example of the link between Title VII’s pur-
pose and the definition of immutability in the Title VII context, con-
sider Fagan v. National Cash Register Co.148  In Fagan, the court held 
 
141 Id. (emphasis added). 
142 Id. 
143 507 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1975). 
144 Id. at 1086. 
145 Id. at 1087–88. 
146 Id. at 1091 (emphasis omitted). 
147 See, e.g., Earwood v. Cont’l Se. Lines, Inc., 539 F.2d 1349, 1351 (4th Cir. 1976); Arnett v. 
Aspin, 846 F. Supp. 1234, 1239 (E.D. Pa. 1994); Rogers v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 
229 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); see also Robert Post, Prejudicial Appearances:  The Logic of American An-
tidiscrimination Law, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1, 33 (2000). 
148 481 F.2d 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
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that a particular employee grooming code did not constitute a viola-
tion of Title VII, drawing heavily on the Court’s rationale in McDon-
nell Douglas Corp.  In doing so, the D.C. Circuit began by emphasizing 
that “[p]erhaps no facet of business life is more important than a 
company’s place in public estimation. . . . Good grooming regulations 
reflect a company’s policy in our highly competitive business envi-
ronment.”149  In contrast, the court explained that “Congress has said 
that no exercise of that responsibility may result in discriminatory 
deprivation of equal opportunity because of immutable race, national 
origin, color, or sex classification.”150  In applying both what it consid-
ered to be a legitimate employment requirement and the need to 
protect employees from illegitimate discrimination, the D.C. Circuit 
noted that “there are ‘societal as well as personal interests’ so in-
volved in providing equal opportunities for citizens, that an employer 
is not to be permitted under [Title VII] to discriminate because of 
grounds ‘resulting from forces beyond [the employees’] control.’”151  
After emphasizing the importance of control in determining what 
types of discrimination are prohibited by Title VII, the D.C. Circuit 
concluded as follows:  “[b]ut equally it seems obvious to us, that one 
seeking an employment opportunity as in our situation where hair 
length readily can be changed, may be required to conform to reasonable 
grooming standards designed to further the employing company’s in-
terest by which that very opportunity is provided.”152  Thus, the court 
held that the grooming code did not violate the terms of Title VII be-
cause the trait in question could easily be changed.  In turn, the 
grooming code did not impact the effected employee’s employment 
opportunity—the employee could simply modify his hair length. 
In sum, in Fagan, just as in McDonnell Douglas Corp., the court de-
fined the immutability requirement in light of the principles animat-
ing Title VII.  If Title VII, in balancing the interests of the employers 
and employees, was intended to provide equal employment opportu-
nity, then the immutability requirement would be interpreted to ad-
vance that principle.  In turn, immutability in the Title VII context 
has been understood to mean something completely different than it 
does in the asylum context.  In the Title VII context, an immutable 
trait is a trait that is not under the individual’s control.  Thus, an in-
 
149 Id. at 1124–25. 
150 Id. at 1125. 
151 Id. (second alteration in original).  Indeed, footnote 23, attached to the foregoing text, 
reads “[s]uch matter as we have quoted in this paragraph reflects the principles compris-
ing the philosophy of the Court in McDonnell Douglas v. Green.”  Id. at 1125, n.23. 
152 Id. (second emphasis added). 
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dividual is considered to have a mutable trait either if he chose to 
adopt the trait or if he could easily change the trait.  In this way, im-
mutability in the Title VII context captures the control requirement:  
a trait is beyond the control of the individual if he both did not 
choose to adopt the trait and he cannot currently change the trait.  
For this reason, race is the paradigmatic immutable trait in the Title 
VII context as individuals neither choose to adopt their race, nor can 
they change their race. 
C.  Thinking About Immutability in Context 
As should be clear, importing the definition of immutability from 
the asylum context into the Title VII context would likely lead to very 
different outcomes in cases addressing grooming codes.  Instead of 
considering whether the trait in question was beyond the control of 
the employee, courts would consider whether or not the trait was one 
that the employee should be required to change.  As a result, courts 
would examine the connection between “grooming” choices and per-
sonal identity.  In certain circumstances, courts might very well de-
termine that certain grooming choices were simply too bound up 
with individual identity to require employees to change their appear-
ance.  Indeed, such an approach has already been advanced by a 
number of scholars.153 
But importing the definition of immutability from asylum cases in-
to the Title VII context would be to misunderstand the principles 
animating each doctrinal sphere.  Rightfully or not, Title VII is un-
derstood as legislation aimed at balancing the autonomy of the em-
ployee against the business interests of the employer.154  In navigating 
these competing values, the courts have interpreted Title VII as ad-
 
153 See, e.g., Katharine T. Bartlett, Only Girls Wear Barrettes:  Dress and Appearance Standards, 
Community Norms, and Workplace Equality, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2541 (1994) (discussing the 
grooming cases without focusing heavily on their history or chronology); Paulette M. 
Caldwell, A Hair Piece:  Perspectives on the Intersection of Race and Gender, 1991 DUKE L.J. 365 
(1991); Roberto J. Gonzalez, Cultural Rights and the Immutability Requirement in Disparate 
Impact Doctrine, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2195 (2003) (arguing for the elimination of the immuta-
bility requirement under Title VII); Karl E. Klare, Power/Dressing:  Regulation of Employee 
Appearance, 26 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1395 (1992); Juan F. Perea, Ethnicity and Prejudice:  Re-
evaluating “National Origin” Discrimination Under Title VII, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 805, 860 
(1994) (arguing that Title VII should be amended to include a prohibition against work-
place discrimination on the basis of ethnic traits); Ponte & Gillan, supra note 132; Post, 
supra note 147; Camille Gear Rich, Performing Racial and Ethnic Identity:  Discrimination by 
Proxy and the Future of Title VII, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1134 (2004); Mary Whisner, Gender-
Specific Clothing Regulation:  A Study in Patriarchy, 5 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 73 (1982); Kenji 
Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769 (2002). 
154 See supra notes 131–52. 
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vancing the principle of equal employment opportunity and used an 
immutability criterion that is meant to capture that principle.155  As a 
result, the term immutability has a very specific meaning when de-
ployed in Title VII cases. 
In contrast, asylum law is built to address a very different set of 
problems.  While there are any number of individuals who have rea-
son to seek protection in the United States, asylum law must find a 
way to differentiate between those who are in the most desperate 
need of protection.156  In doing so, asylum differentiates by examining 
the nexus between the persecution and the rationale for that perse-
cution.157  In such a context, the immutability criterion does not seek 
to help determine which individuals could have avoided persecution, 
but which individuals were persecuted for traits that we view as having 
value.  It is for this reason that immutability in the asylum context is 
not concerned with whether the traits in question were beyond the 
control of the persecuted, but whether the traits in question are the 
type that the individual should never have had to change. 
Immutability means different things in different contexts.  In the 
Title VII context, immutable traits are traits you neither chose to 
adopt nor could you change.  In the asylum context, a trait is consid-
ered immutable so long as you should not have been required to 
change it.  And in each context, these varying definitions are linked 
to the principles the immutability factor is meant to capture.  This 
analysis leads to two conclusions.  First, despite the propensity of 
courts for doing so,158 importing the definition of immutability from 
one context to the other does not make much sense.  Second, if we 
are to understand the meaning of the immutability factor in the 
equal protection context, we must first figure out what principle it is 
meant to advance.  It is to this second task that we now turn our at-
tention. 
 
155 See supra Part V.B. 
156 See supra note 130. 
157 See supra notes 119–30. 
158 See, e.g., In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 442-43 (Cal. 2008) (relying on cases consider-
ing the immutability factor in the asylum context in defining immutability for the pur-
poses of equal protection); Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 438 (Conn. 
2008) (same); Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571, 614–15 (Md. 2007) (refusing to rely on a 
case defining immutability in the asylum context because the appellees neglected to pre-
sent scientific or sociological studies supporting the contention that sexual orientation is 
an immutable trait); Andersen v. King County, 138 P.3d 963, 974 (Wash. 2006) (consider-
ing the applicability of a case defining immutability in the asylum context to equal pro-
tection cases, only to reject doing so on the grounds that the case in question had been 
overruled). 
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VI.  IMMUTABILITY IN THE EQUAL PROTECTION CONTEXT:  BACK TO 
THE PROCESS-BASED PARADIGM 
Examining the link between the definition of immutability and its 
doctrinal context provides a framework for analyzing the meaning of 
immutability in the equal protection context.  In the asylum context, 
immutability helped advance the underlying principle of protecting 
others from persecution, enabling courts to differentiate between 
those who were most in need of such protections and those who were 
not.  In the Title VII context, immutability helped advance the prin-
ciple of equal employment opportunity, enabling courts to differenti-
ate between those who were discriminated against for traits beyond 
their control and those who were not.  The question then becomes 
what is the principle driving equal protection doctrine and how does 
immutability help isolate cases where there have been equal protec-
tion violations. 
We explored the answer to the first part of this inquiry above.159  
Current equal protection doctrine has crystallized the Equal Protec-
tion Clause into a constitutional provision aimed at protecting mi-
norities who might otherwise lose out to majoritarian politics.160  
Thus, equal protection doctrine employs a process-based paradigm, 
which protects the discrete and insular minorities referenced in foot-
note four of Carolene Products.161  In this way, the Equal Protection 
Clause is meant to prevent process failures where political animosities 
grab hold of political deliberations. 
Moreover, by focusing on process as opposed to substance, equal 
protection doctrine becomes a democracy enhancing tool, without 
passing judgment on the substance of any individual claim of dis-
crimination.162  Thus, courts look to determine whether, based on 
past history, it is likely that a new piece of legislation represents an-
other instance of discriminatory policies.  In doing so, courts do not 
consider whether a group is worthy of additional protection because 
of who the group is.  Instead, courts are meant to eschew substantive 
moral judgments in favor of a process-based paradigm, which focuses 
on the likeliness of discrimination and not the worthiness of protec-
tion. 
However, as we have already noted, in emphasizing a purely proc-
ess-based approach, equal protection doctrine remains vulnerable to 
 
159 See supra Parts II–III. 
160 See supra notes 47–54 and accompanying text. 
161 Id. 
162 See generally ELY, supra note 3, at 30–32, 135–79. 
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what we have termed the “criminal problem.”163  While focusing on 
process ensures that groups receive protection when it appears likely 
that they have been discriminated against, it also precludes the use of 
substantive moral judgments even when doing so seems intuitive.  Ac-
cordingly, a pure process-based account does not provide any analytic 
tools for explaining why criminals ought not to be considered a sus-
pect classification.  Focusing on the history of discrimination against 
criminals, it would seem possible, if not likely, that current legislation 
restricting criminals is the result of political animosities.  In turn, the 
current paradigm would, on one level, recommend subjecting legisla-
tion affecting criminals to heightened scrutiny. 
And yet, the obvious response to such a suggestion is that crimi-
nals are deserving of “discrimination.”  Indeed, criminals are being 
punished for their own actions.  The problem, however, for the pure 
process-based paradigm is that such judgments—who is and is not 
“deserving of discrimination”—are the very types of judgments a fo-
cus on process is meant to avoid.  In other words, a pure process-
based paradigm cannot differentiate between race-based classifica-
tions and criminal-based classifications. 
It is this Article’s contention that immutability was deployed in the 
equal protection context, in part, to solve the criminal problem.  
However, as with the other contexts in which immutability plays a 
doctrinal role, to see how immutability helps solve the criminal prob-
lem requires defining immutability in a way that fits with the overall 
principles animating equal protection doctrine. 
A.  Redefining Immutability as Concerned Solely with Entrance Cases 
The central claim of this Article is that immutability—when con-
sidered in the equal protection context—means something different 
than it does in other contexts.  This is because, like other uses of the 
immutability factor, the meaning of the term varies depending on the 
principle it is meant to advance. 
The Equal Protection Clause, in constructing suspect classifica-
tions, seeks to ensure that discrete and insular minorities are pro-
tected from the animus of the majority.164  To see how the immutabil-
ity factor could further that purpose requires looking back at the 
Supreme Court’s first articulation of the factor in Frontiero v. Richard-
son: 
 
163 See supra Part III. 
164 See supra notes 47–50 and accompanying text. 
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Moreover, since sex, like race and national origin, is an immutable 
characteristic determined solely by the accident of birth, the imposition 
of special disabilities upon the members of a particular sex because of 
their sex would seem to violate “the basic concept of our system that legal bur-
dens should bear some relationship to individual responsibility . . . .”165 
In linking immutability to the notion of individual responsibility, the 
Frontiero Court invoked a line of cases in which the Supreme Court 
announced that it considered illegitimacy a suspect classification.166 
In the illegitimacy cases, the Court emphasized that “no child is 
responsible for his birth and penalizing the illegitimate child is an in-
effectual—as well as an unjust—way of deterring the parent.”167  In 
turn, the Court concluded that penalizing illegitimate children vio-
lated the Equal Protection Clause:  “the Equal Protection Clause does 
enable us to strike down discriminatory laws relating to status of 
birth.”168  The Court reached this determination because “imposing 
disabilities on the illegitimate child is contrary to the basic concept of 
our system that legal burdens should bear some relationship to indi-
vidual responsibility or wrongdoing.”169 
In grounding the immutability factor in its illegitimacy cases, the 
Court focused on the way in which immutability might ensure that 
laws impose liabilities only where doing so bears some relationship to 
individual responsibility or wrongdoing.  Illegitimate children clearly 
have not engaged in conduct that deserves to have legal burdens im-
posed.  They have simply acquired a trait through an “accident of 
birth.”170 
This was the core feature of the illegitimacy cases that the Court 
hoped to capture in the immutability factor.  Immutability was meant 
to help weed out cases where classifications were being used to im-
pose legal burdens on groups without a legitimate reason, and where 
the burdens imposed bore no relationship to individual responsibil-
ity.  But the link to the illegitimacy cases tells us about more than just 
the principle at work.  As with immutability in the asylum and Title 
VII contexts, the principle animating immutability in the equal pro-
tection context also points to the definition of the term. 
 
165 Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (emphasis added) (quoting Weber v. 
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972)). 
166 See generally Benjamin G. Ledsham, Note, Means to Legitimate Ends:  Same-Sex Marriage 
Through the Lens of Illegitimacy-Based Discrimination, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2373, 2376 (2007) 
(discussing the “Supreme Court’s case law confronting discrimination against illegitimate 
children”). 
167 Weber, 406 U.S. at 175; see also Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628, 632 (1974). 
168 Weber, 406 U.S. at 176. 
169 Id. at 175. 
170 Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686–87. 
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As already emphasized, the Court, in first introducing immutabil-
ity, focused on the fact that immutable traits are “accidents of 
birth.”171  This, of course, makes sense in light of the fact that the 
Court was drawing on the illegitimacy cases.172  But the reason that 
the Court found imposing liabilities on illegitimate children so ab-
horrent is because the children never chose to enter into the classifi-
cation; they were born illegitimate.  Put differently, the Court was not 
focused on whether such children would ever be able to exit the clas-
sification, but the fact that the children never chose to enter the clas-
sification. 
Similarly, instead of using immutability to determine whether a 
particular trait can or cannot be changed, immutability in the equal 
protection context appears concerned with whether or not a trait was 
chosen.173  In other words, the immutability inquiry in the equal pro-
tection context is not concerned with whether an individual can exit 
the classification in question, but whether or not the individual chose 
to enter the classification. 
Examining the Court’s analysis in Frontiero also explains why, in 
light of the principles animating the Equal Protection Clause, focus-
ing on entrance makes sense.  As discussed above, equal protection 
focuses on classifications in an attempt to determine when certain 
pieces of legislation are the result of inter-group animus.174  Classifica-
tions are useful because they can alert a court to a possible equal pro-
tection violation.  Most of the time, classifications are harmless.  A 
rule that prohibits smoking in public places has a negative impact on 
the class of smokers.  However, this gives us little pause; through the 
democratic process, a legislature has determined that a particular 
course of conduct must be circumscribed.  In other words, based on a 
legitimate rationale, a legislature has determined that the class of 
smokers “deserves” to be singled out for this type of treatment.175 
 
171 Id. 
172 Id. (quoting Weber, 406 U.S. at 175). 
173 See United States v. Coleman, 166 F.3d 428, 431 (2d Cir. 1999); Quiban v. Veterans Ad-
min., 928 F.2d 1154, 1161 n.13 (D.C. Cir. 1991); United States v. Harris, 537 F.2d 563, 565 
n.2 (1st Cir. 1976); Carbonaro v. Reeher, 392 F. Supp. 753, 757 (E.D. Pa. 1975). 
174 See supra notes 47–76 and accompanying text. 
175 See, e.g., BRIAN BARRY, CULTURE & EQUALITY:  AN EGALITARIAN CRITIQUE OF 
MULTICULTURALISM 34 (2002) (“If we consider virtually any law, we shall find that it is 
much more burdensome to some people than to others.  Speed limits inhibit only those 
who like to drive fast.  Law prohibiting drunk driving have no impact on teetotallers.  On-
ly smokers are stopped by prohibitions on smoking in public places.  Only those who 
want to own a handgun are affected by a ban on them, and so ad infinitum.”). 
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Under current equal protection doctrine, courts are charged with 
the task of identifying classifications that are not legitimate.  How-
ever, it is hard to know when the use of a classification violates the 
Equal Protection Clause.  Under the current doctrine, courts are giv-
en a variety of tools to find likely cases where a classification has been 
employed illegitimately.  Some of those tools instruct courts to look at 
the background facts regarding the likelihood that the members of 
the class were able to participate in the process by which the relevant 
piece of legislation was passed.176  In circumstances where a particular 
group has limited political power and has been subjected to discrimi-
nation historically, courts have good reason to think that the use of a 
classification singling out such a group is the result of inter-group 
animus.177  Such classifications serve as good candidates to receive 
heightened scrutiny. 
However, the Supreme Court also requires that courts consider 
immutability in determining whether a classification should be 
deemed suspect.  The goal of the immutability inquiry is to deter-
mine whether there are reasons to believe that there is any link be-
tween individual responsibility and the legal burdens imposed by the 
statute in question; if the classification’s trait is immutable, then it 
would indicate that the individual members of the classification 
should not have legal burdens imposed on them for membership in 
the classification.  But courts are interested in this inquiry not be-
cause they want to blame the members of a particular classification; 
instead, the absence of a link between individual responsibility and 
the classification makes it more likely that inter-group animus moti-
vated the statute or regulation in question.  This is because without a 
link between individual responsibility and legal burdens, it becomes 
increasingly likely that invidious discrimination may have driven the 
drafting of the statute or regulation.  Thus, the immutability inquiry 
is simply another doctrinal tool for determining whether there is 
good reason to believe that the use of a particular classification con-
stituted an equal protection violation;178 in such circumstances, courts 
use strict scrutiny to further investigate the justification behind the 
legislation or regulation in question. 
It is here that we begin to see why understanding the immutability 
inquiry as asking whether the members of the class chose to enter the 
classification makes sense in the context of the Equal Protection 
 
176 See supra note 44. 
177 See supra note 58. 
178 For further explanation of the process-based paradigm, see Helfand, supra note 46; 
Rubenfeld, supra note 55. 
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Clause.  If immutability is a proxy for individual responsibility, then 
the immutability inquiry ought to focus on whether the members of 
the classification are facing legal burdens based upon a course of 
conduct in which they engaged.  A smoker, who faces the imposition 
of burdens as a result of his smoking, faces those burdens because of 
his conduct.  If a statute imposed burdens on African Americans, they 
would be facing burdens despite the fact that their membership in 
the relevant classification is not based upon a chosen course of con-
duct.  It is because the goal of the suspect-classification inquiry is to 
determine whether inter-group animus motivated a statute that con-
sidering whether the individual is responsible for membership in the 
classification makes sense.  In turn, the immutability factor is meant 
to further that inquiry by requiring courts to consider whether the 
legal burdens imposed bear any relationship to individual responsi-
bility.  In circumstances where an individual was simply thrust into 
the classification—by an accident of birth—imposing burdens on the 
members of such classification would seem to derive from inter-group 
animus. 
Focusing on the ability to exit a classification, however, would 
serve a different purpose.  Consider again, for contrast, the use of the 
immutability factor in the Title VII context.  Under Title VII, the gov-
erning principle is equal employment opportunity.179  In instances 
where an individual claims that he has been rejected for employment 
because of a particular trait, courts investigate whether the trait is 
immutable.180  In doing so, courts balance the competing interests of 
the employer and the employee, trying to determine why, in the par-
ticular case, the individual has lost out on a particular employment 
opportunity.181  To do so, courts use the immutability inquiry to focus 
on whether the individual had the “opportunity” to actually secure 
the employment in question; if the individual is responsible for hav-
ing the trait, then the individual can be deemed to have had the op-
portunity to secure the employment in question.182  Thus, if the em-
ployer requires prospective employees to adhere to a grooming code, 
the fact that a potential employee could have modified his appear-
ance to comply with the grooming code—but failed to do so—would 
mean that the employee had the opportunity to secure the employ-
 
179 See supra notes 131–52 and accompanying text. 
180 See supra Part V.B. 
181 Id. 
182 See generally Sandi Farrell, Toward Getting Beyond the Blame Game:  A Critique of the Ideology of 
Voluntarism in Title VII Jurisprudence, 92 KY. L.J. 483 (2004) (noting the importance of vol-
untarism in the context of Title VII). 
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ment.  In turn, it is the prospective employee who is, under the cur-
rent Title VII paradigm, to blame for the fact that he lost out on the 
employment opportunity.183  Indeed, it is for this reason that some 
have criticized the current Title VII paradigm as being, at bottom, a 
“blame game.”184  And this is why immutability, in the Title VII con-
text, is defined in such a way to allow courts to consider both whether 
or not an individual chose to enter the classification and whether or 
not he could still exit the classification. 
Similarly, in employing immutability in asylum cases, courts focus 
on whether an individual can or should be required to exit a particu-
lar classification.  This type of inquiry—focusing on exit—makes 
sense when the principle in play is determining who is most deserving 
of asylum protections.185  Such an inquiry focuses on the substance of 
the asylum seeker’s claim; is the asylum seeker, in light of the type of 
persecution he has experienced, sufficiently worthy of being granted 
asylum?  Thus, immutability in the asylum context is aimed at evaluat-
ing the asylum seeker’s ability to exit the classification in question 
and the costs of doing so.  In turn, the immutability inquiry, in the 
asylum context, asks courts to determine whether the trait in question 
is one the individual “cannot change, or should not be required to 
change.”186 
In contrast, under the Equal Protection Clause, courts do not care 
who is to blame for the imposition of particular legal burdens or how 
important a particular trait is to the members of a particular classifi-
cation.  Instead, under the process-based paradigm that animates 
current equal protection doctrine, courts are simply interested to 
know whether some link exists between imposing burdens on a par-
ticular classification and individual responsibility.  In other words, the 
question is not whether the classification’s members could have 
avoided the burdens imposed by changing their traits, but whether 
there is a good reason for imposing the burdens in the first place.  
 
183 Of course, if Title VII were reconceptualized as advancing a different principle, then the 
definition of immutability in the Title VII context also would need to change.  For this 
reason, critiques of the current Title VII paradigm invariably focus on the problems 
caused by the current immutability inquiry under Title VII.  See Farrell, supra note 182, at 
483 (arguing that the use of voluntarist ideology in Title VII jurisprudence is deeply prob-
lematic and needs to be rethought); Post, supra note 147, at 16, 33–40 (arguing that the 
“dominant conception of American antidiscrimination law, distorts and masks the actual op-
eration of that law, and by so doing, potentially undermines the law’s coherence and use-
fulness as a tool of transformative social policy”). 
184 See Farrell, supra note 182. 
185 See supra note 128–30 and accompanying text. 
186 In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985) (emphasis added). 
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When there does not appear to have been a good reason for impos-
ing legal burdens on the classification in the first place—that is, when 
there does not appear to be a link between individual responsibility 
and the imposition of legal burdens—courts think it increasingly like-
ly that inter-group animus may have motivated the statute or regula-
tion in question.  And it is in such circumstances where heightened 
scrutiny is appropriate. 
The immutability factor, in the equal protection context, was built 
to investigate this very question.  In order to determine the link be-
tween individual responsibility and the legal burdens imposed, im-
mutability looks to see whether or not burdens are a result of a cho-
sen trait or a chosen conduct.  When it is not—when the trait or 
conduct in question is a mere accident of birth—then courts have 
good reason to apply heightened scrutiny in reviewing the constitu-
tionality of the statute or regulation.  By focusing on entrance into 
the classification, courts can use the immutability factor as another 
useful tool in its process-based inquiry. 
One can see how the immutability-as-entrance paradigm links 
immutability to the principle of personal responsibility by consider-
ing its impact on the “criminal problem.”187  As discussed above, a 
pure process-based account of equal protection doctrine does not 
provide any obvious answer as to why criminals should not be consid-
ered a suspect classification; criminals undoubtedly face discrimina-
tion and their inability to participate in the political process leaves 
them quite powerless.188  While the Court clearly indicated in Frontiero 
that the immutability factor was meant to ensure that legal burdens 
would be tied to individual responsibility,189 on the prevailing view 
that defines immutability as unable to change, it is far from clear how 
deploying the immutability factor could help exclude the class of 
criminals from the ranks of suspect classifications. 
The link, however, between individual responsibility and immuta-
bility comes into focus once we consider immutability’s definition in 
context.  Linked to the “accident of birth” language in Frontiero, the 
Court extracted immutability from its illegitimacy cases.190  Thus, the 
immutability inquiry, in the context of the Equal Protection Clause, 
asks courts to determine whether a particular trait was adopted voli-
tionally.  Such an inquiry—focusing on whether an individual chose 
to enter a particular classification—enables a court to consider 
 
187 See supra Part III. 
188 See supra note 88. 
189 Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686–87 (1973). 
190 See supra notes 167–70 and accompanying text. 
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whether imposing legal burdens on a particular class stems from a 
chosen course of action.  Applying this brand of equal protection 
immutability to the class of criminals would clearly preclude them 
from becoming a suspect classification; criminals have chosen to en-
gage in a set of acts and in turn they have suffered consequences 
stemming from those acts. 
Indeed, this basic link between thinking about immutability as 
concerned with coerced entrance into a classification and the princi-
ples of the Equal Protection Clause has led a number of courts to rely 
on Frontiero’s “accident of birth” language in disposing of difficult 
claims for deeming criminals a suspect classification.191  In addition, 
the D.C. Circuit concluded, in a case addressing whether World War 
II veterans could constitute a suspect class, that “the ‘immutable cha-
racteristic’ notion, as it appears in Supreme Court decisions, is 
tightly-cabined.  It does not mean, broadly, something done that 
cannot be undone.  Instead, it is a trait ‘determined solely by accident 
of birth’ . . . .”192  Thinking about immutability in this way captures the 
general intuition that there is nothing inherently suspect in imposing 
legal burdens on individuals for their conduct; indeed, such an ap-
proach is an understood premise of criminal and civil liability more 
generally. 
In this way, the Court deployed immutability as another indication 
of whether the use of a particular classification was likely a function 
of inter-group animus.  Where classifications are based upon a trait 
that is an accident of birth—that is, an immutable trait for the pur-
poses of the Equal Protection Clause—courts have another reason to 
deem the classification inherently suspect.  To impose legal burdens 
under such circumstances would be to impose burdens on individuals 
for having a trait that they never could have avoided.  Under such 
circumstances, it would be highly unlikely that the proposed burdens 
had a relationship to individual responsibility.  Instead, they are more 
likely a function of inter-group animus and should therefore be sub-
jected to heightened scrutiny.  Accordingly, the immutability factor 
addresses the criminal problem by advancing the principle of indi-
 
191 See, e.g., United States v. Harris, 537 F.2d 563, 564 n.2 (1st Cir. 1976) (rejecting the appli-
cation of the accident of birth classification to felons); Carbonaro v. Reeher, 392 F. Supp. 
753, 757 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (same). 
192 Quiban v. Veterans Admin., 928 F.2d 1154, 1160 n.13 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (internal citations 
and emphasis omitted); see also United States v. Coleman, 166 F.3d 428, 431 (2d Cir. 
1999) (noting that the Supreme Court rejected the idea that a classification is suspect 
when entry into the class is voluntary). 
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vidual responsibility, which the Court has understood as standing at 
the center of the Equal Protection Clause’s process-based paradigm. 
B.  Necessary But Not Sufficient:  Reconsidering the Alienage Classification 
The criminal problem, however, was just one of the criticisms lev-
eled by scholars against the immutability factor.  In addition, scholars 
have expressed particular skepticism regarding the utility of the im-
mutability inquiry, given that it does not appear to be either a neces-
sary or a sufficient requirement for suspect classification status.  As we 
noted above, when critics of immutability claim that immutability is 
not a sufficient criterion for suspect classification status, they point to 
a host of immutable traits that are not suspect, for example:  disabil-
ity, height, and age.193  But when arguing that immutability is not nec-
essary, only one example is ever presented:  alienage.194  The fact that 
alienage is the only example where immutability is not necessary for 
suspect classification, makes it something of an anomaly, a case worth 
more careful examination.195 
 
193 See, e.g., Tribe, supra note 3, at 1073 n.51. 
194 See supra notes 84–86. 
195 In fact, its “anomaly” status has led some commentators to wonder whether alienage ever 
deserved suspect status.  See, e.g., Louis Lusky, Footnote Redux:  A Carolene Products Remi-
niscence, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1105 n.72 (1982) (describing the inclusion of alien sta-
tus as “incomprehensible”); see also Yoshino, supra note 3, at 571 n.41 (arguing aliens 
should not be given protected status because alienage is not immediately visible).  This 
reluctance to embrace alienage as a suspect classification also appears to have manifested 
itself in the “political function” exception to alienage’s suspect classification status:  
“[O]ur scrutiny will not be so demanding where we deal with matters resting firmly within 
a State’s constitutional prerogatives . . . . [and] constitutional responsibility for the estab-
lishment and operation of its own government, as well as the qualifications of an appro-
priately designated class of public office holders.”  Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 
648 (1973) (establishing the political function exception and applying the exception to 
civil servants); see also Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432 (1982) (applying the excep-
tion to “peace officers”); Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979) (applying the exception 
to public school teachers); Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978) (applying the excep-
tion to police officers).  But see Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216 (1984) (refusing to apply-
ing the exception to notary publics). 
   The secondary literature is replete with innumerable views on the political function 
exception.  Some authors have been generally critical of the Court’s willingness to apply 
the political function exception.  See, e.g., ELIZABETH HULL, WITHOUT JUSTICE FOR ALL:  
THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF ALIENS 29–53 (1985); Gerald M. Rosberg, Aliens and 
Equal Protection: Why Not the Right to Vote?, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1092 (1977).  Others have seen 
it as an important and helpful example of context-sensitive equal protection analysis.  See 
Goldberg, supra note 8.  Still others have argued that the political function exception 
rightfully returns authority over particular political determinations to the states.  See Earl 
M. Maltz, Citizenship and the Constitution:  A History and Critique of the Supreme Court’s Alie-
nage Jurisprudence, 28 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1135 (1996).  And another group of scholars have, 
while approving of the general thrust of the Court’s alienage jurisprudence, expressed 
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The Court first announced alienage as a suspect classification in 
1971, stating the following: 
But the Court’s decisions have established that classifications based on 
alienage, like those based on nationality or race, are inherently suspect 
and subject to close judicial scrutiny.  Aliens as a class are a prime exam-
ple of a “discrete and insular” minority (see United States v. Carolene 
Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152–153, n. 4 (1938)) for whom such height-
ened judicial solicitude is appropriate.196 
The Court did not elaborate on why alienage was like nationality and 
race, but the citation to Carolene Products does seem to indicate that 
the argument is being made on process-based grounds.197  The Court 
has, however, on one occasion, stated that it believes alienage to be 
immutable: 
And the presumption of statutory validity may also be undermined when 
a State has enacted legislation creating classes based upon certain other 
immutable human attributes.  See, e.g., Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 
(national origin); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (alienage); Gomez v. 
Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (illegitimacy); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (gender).198 
In fact, combining the Court’s decisions in Graham v. Richardson and 
Parham v. Hughes, gives the distinct impression that the Court sees 
alienage as fulfilling the criteria necessary for suspect classification 
status under the process-plus-immutability paradigm.199  But under 
conventional wisdom—which defines immutability as the inability to 
change200—it is far from clear how alienage could be considered an 
immutable trait. 
 
concern regarding the wide ranging application of the political function exception.  See, 
e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Equality with a Human Face:  Justice Blackmun and the Equal Protec-
tion of Aliens, 8 HAMLINE L. REV. 51, 63 (1985); Note, A Dual Standard for State Discrimina-
tion Against Aliens, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1516, 1532–36 (1979). 
   Regardless of one’s view of the political function test, it seems clear that the Court 
has been ambivalent about how to map the tiers-of-scrutiny approach on to the alienage 
classification.  Thus, aliens have been deemed a protected class although they often do 
not receive the typical protections associated with that status.  Indeed, this disconnect on-
ly further raises the question of what about the alienage classification led the Court to 
deem it a suspect classification.  This Article’s analysis of immutability hopes to provide 
part of the answer to that question. 
196 Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371–72 (1971) (footnotes and citations omitted). 
197 See generally Gilbert Paul Carrasco, Congressional Arrogation of Power:  Alien Constellation in 
the Galaxy of Equal Protection, 74 B.U. L. REV. 591, 606–16 (1994) (arguing state laws based 
on alienage are unconstitutional unless they are narrowly tailored to meet a compelling 
state interest). 
198 Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 351 (1979). 
199 Carrasco, supra note 197, at 606–16. 
200 See supra note 77. 
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Unsurprisingly, some courts have ignored the Supreme Court’s 
conclusion and explicitly stated that alienage is not immutable.201  In 
trying to reconcile the fact that one can change their alien status—an 
alien can become a citizen—with the Supreme Court’s claim that 
alienage is immutable, Kenji Yoshino has stated the following:  “The 
absence of analysis in [Parham v. Hughes], however, leads me to sus-
pect that [the Supreme Court is] erroneously inferring that a group 
is immutable if it has received heightened scrutiny.”202  Although un-
derstandable, concluding that the Court simply made a mistake 
somehow seems false. 
As should already be clear, under Frontiero’s “accident of birth” de-
finition alienage is an immutable trait.  This is because in our analy-
sis, a trait is considered immutable in the equal protection context 
when the trait in question was not chosen; thus, traits that are mere 
accidents of birth are considered immutable.  Indeed, given the prin-
ciples driving the suspect classification inquiry, the fact that alienage 
is immutable makes good sense.  To subject an individual to liabilities 
simply because he was born in a foreign country would run counter 
to the Equal Protection Clause’s underlying principle:  that the impo-
sition of a burden must be a function of an individual’s personal li-
ability or wrongdoing.  As a result, the immutability factor helps ad-
vance the principle underlying the Equal Protection Clause by 
further bolstering alienage’s claim to suspect classification status. 
Indeed, this same dynamic appears to have been at work in the 
Court’s subsequent analysis of the alienage classification.  In Plyler v. 
Doe, the Court dealt with a Texas statute that denied enrollment in 
public schools to children not legally admitted into the United 
States.203  In deciding the case, the Court held that the statute did not 
violate the Equal Protection Clause, in part, because illegal aliens did 
not constitute a suspect class.204  This holding emphasized the fact 
that the class in question was made up of illegal aliens; as repeatedly 
noted, aliens are a suspect classification.205  As part of its analysis, the 
Court concluded that illegal alien status was not immutable.  This 
should come as no surprise—even on the conventional account, ille-
 
201 See, e.g., Able v. United States, 968 F. Supp. 850, 863 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (noting that “alie-
nage is not immutable”); Smothers v. Benitez, 806 F. Supp. 299, 306 n.10 (D.P.R. 1992) 
(referencing secondary literature for the proposition that alienage is not immutable). 
202 Yoshino, supra note 3, at 495 n.33. 
203 457 U.S. 202, 205–06 (1982). 
204 Id. at 218–24. 
205 Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371–72 (1971). 
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gal alien status is not immutable because it is a status that can be 
changed. 
But in making its determination that illegal alien status was not 
immutable, the Court did not mention the fact that such a status can 
be changed; instead, the Court noted the following:  “Nor is un-
documented status an absolutely immutable characteristic since it is 
the product of conscious, indeed unlawful, action.”206  In other words, 
given the option of constructing immutability as either an exit or en-
trance criterion, the Court chose to employ immutability as an en-
trance criterion.207  Here again, the Court appears to focus its inquiry 
on whether the imposition of liabilities can be tied to the wrongdoing 
of the individuals in question.208  In making such a determination, the 
Court invoked the immutability criterion to show that the imposition 
of liabilities was justified because it was a function of conscious and 
unlawful action.209  Irrelevant to the inquiry was whether the individu-
als that comprised the classification could exit the class; such an in-
quiry did not, apparently, speak to the question of whether the im-
posed liabilities bore any relationship to individual responsibility or 
wrongdoing.  In this way, it was the question of coerced entrance—
and not the question of possible exit—that enabled the Court to de-
termine whether a particular classification should be afforded the 
heightened protections of suspect status. 
Thus, applying the “accident of birth” definition of immutability 
addresses the critique that immutability is not a useful doctrinal tool 
because it is neither a necessary nor sufficient criterion for suspect-
classification status.  Once we understand why the Supreme Court 
understood alienage to be immutable, then all classes that have been 
deemed suspect are immutable, including alienage.  In other words, 
immutability is not simply a factor; it is a wholesale side constraint on 
suspect status.  Accordingly, understanding immutability as applying 
to entrance cases avoids one of the most pronounced criticisms in the 
secondary literature, solidifying immutability’s place in equal protec-
tion doctrine.210 
 
206 Plyler, 457 U.S. at 220. 
207 Id. at 219 n.19 (“Unlike most of the classifications that we have recognized as suspect, en-
try into this class, by virtue of entry into this country, is the product of voluntary action.”). 
208 Id. at 220. 
209 Indeed, the Second Circuit has cited Plyler for this proposition in concluding that cocaine 
dealers, in challenging the Sentencing Guidelines, could not be considered a suspect 
classification.  See United States v. Coleman, 166 F.3d 428, 431 (2d Cir. 1999). 
210 It is also worthwhile to note that using immutability to focus on entrance into classifica-
tions as opposed to exit from them obviates the need to discuss how high exit costs must 
be in order for a classification to be immutable.  Although the need to make such a de-
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But linking immutability to the overall purposes of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause in this way leaves Ely’s critique unanswered.  If the 
immutability factor was intended to allow courts to better determine 
whether or not a particular classification was legitimately relevant to 
individual responsibility, then why not consider relevance directly? 
VII.  IMMUTABILITY VS. RELEVANCE:  RESPONDING TO ELY’S CONCERNS 
Claiming that immutability is best understood as a coerced en-
trance problem does alleviate some of the doctrinal difficulties dis-
cussed above.  It avoids the criminal problem, explains why the Court 
has understood alienage as immutable, and allows the immutability 
factor to act as a necessary condition for suspect-classification status.  
What it does not do, however, is explain another core perplexity re-
garding immutability’s role in equal protection doctrine.  Why not, as 
Ely suggests, simply use relevance instead of immutability in tandem 
with process-based indicia as a barometer for suspect classification 
status?211  If courts, on our account, are meant to use immutability to 
help determine whether a classification is relevant to the legal bur-
dens being imposed, then why use a proxy, when you can have the 
real thing? 
To understand why courts cannot consider relevance directly re-
quires thinking about the overall purpose of the Equal Protection 
Clause’s process-based paradigm.  Ultimately, the purpose of the 
Court’s employing its tiers of scrutiny structure is to determine 
whether laws have been motivated by invidious discriminatory in-
tent.212  The Court has focused on suspect classifications as a way of 
isolating cases where it thinks it is likely that discriminatory intent was 
driving the drafting of a statute or regulation.213  A classification is 
 
termination is not a problem in and of itself, the difficulties inherent in such a doctrinal 
task make eliminating the need a clear virtue of the immutability-as-coerced-entrance de-
finition.  Indeed, it is difficult to develop a principled theory on why sex is immutable 
while homelessness is not; both seem to be classes that are difficult, but not impossible, to 
exit.  However, an individual’s sex is undoubtedly assigned at birth, rendering it immuta-
ble for the purposes of the Equal Protection Clause. 
211 ELY, supra note 3, at 150. 
212 See, e.g., Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977) 
(“Proof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show a violation of the 
Equal Protection Clause.”); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) (“Nevertheless, 
we have not held that a law, neutral on its face and serving ends otherwise within the 
power of government to pursue, is invalid under the Equal Protection Clause simply be-
cause it may affect a greater proportion of one race than of another.”). 
213 Davis, 426 U.S. at 242 (“Necessarily, an invidious discriminatory purpose may often be 
inferred from the totality of the relevant facts, including the fact, if it is true, that the law 
bears more heavily on one race than another.  It is also not infrequently true that the dis-
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deemed suspect when courts have good reason to believe—based on 
a history of discrimination and current political powerlessness—that 
legal burdens are being imposed on a group because of inter-group 
animus.214  Such circumstances represent instances of process-
failure—where a certain group is simply not able to get a fair shake in 
the political process because of its limited size or because of the per-
vasiveness of bias against it. 
The focus on suspect classifications is meant to avoid focusing on 
the substance of the statute or regulation in question.  Courts are 
meant to consider the use of a particular classification without con-
sidering how exactly it has been used in the statute or regulation.  To 
allow courts to simply pass on the relevance of a classification to the 
statute’s stated purpose would be to fail to take seriously the potential 
indications that some sort of underlying discriminatory intent was at 
work.  Equal protection doctrine leans on its suspect classification 
methodology in order to ensure that courts consider the way in which 
histories of discrimination and the current political power structure 
might have played a role in the statute or regulation under considera-
tion.  In this way, suspect classifications allow courts to focus on the 
process through which legislation has been passed in order to pro-
vide heightened procedural protections to the groups who most need 
them.215 
This is why considering relevance directly would be so problem-
atic.  In the construction of suspect classifications, courts are sup-
posed to consider the process-based hurdles faced by certain groups.  
Considering whether a particular classification was relevant would en-
tail passing judgment on whether it was legitimate to impose a par-
ticular legal burden on the classification in question; put differently, 
it would allow courts to ignore the procedural inquiry and determine 
whether the statute was constitutional on the substance.  Doing so 
would strip precariously positioned groups of the procedural protec-
tions captured by the suspect classification inquiry.  Indeed, this is 
why courts are supposed to consider the relationship between the 
 
criminatory impact—in the jury cases for example, the total or seriously disproportionate 
exclusion of Negroes from jury venires—may for all practical purposes demonstrate un-
constitutionality because in various circumstances the discrimination is very difficult to 
explain on nonracial grounds.”). 
214 See supra note 44. 
215 See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (“[A]ll legal restrictions 
which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect.  That is not 
to say that all such restrictions are unconstitutional.  It is to say that courts must subject 
them to the most rigid scrutiny.  Pressing public necessity may sometimes justify the exis-
tence of such restrictions; racial antagonism never can.”). 
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classification and the goal of the statute only after determining what 
level of scrutiny the classification deserves.  To allow relevance to be-
come part of the suspect classification inquiry would be to undermine 
the process-based protections incorporated into current equal pro-
tection doctrine.216 
Of course, as we have noted, the traditional indicia of suspectness 
do not, on their own, provide an adequate framework for considering 
the existence of process failures.  By themselves, they leave open the 
possibility for criminals to become a suspect classification.  As a result, 
the traditional indicia of suspectness turned out not to be good 
enough indicators that inter-group animus was motivating a particu-
lar statute.  This is because in some instances there was good reason 
for imposing legal burdens on a group—like criminals—that histori-
cally had been the subject of discriminatory legislation.  Thus, courts 
needed another indicator in order to better isolate classifications 
where it was even more likely that inter-group animus played a role in 
the legislative process. 
Immutability is able to play that role.  As opposed to relevance, 
immutability can serve as a good indicator of whether discriminatory 
intent has motivated a statute without requiring a court to consider 
the substance of the statute.  Immutability, understood as concerned 
with accidents of birth, helps courts determine whether a statute, 
which employs a classification, is likely the result of inter-group ani-
mus.  In this way, it enables courts to evaluate whether the imposition 
of legal burdens on a particular group is the result of inter-group 
animus.  In turn, courts can determine what level of scrutiny to em-
ploy in considering the connection between the ostensible purpose of 
the legislation and the use of the classification.  As a result, immuta-
bility can further the overall purposes of the process-based paradigm. 
VIII. CONCLUSION:  THINKING ABOUT IMMUTABILITY AND SAME-SEX 
MARRIAGE 
This Article has advanced two primary propositions.  First, that the 
definition of immutable is contextual.  This became clear when we 
considered the definition of immutability in both asylum law and Ti-
tle VII.  In each context, the term immutability took on a different 
meaning, depending on the principles the immutability factor was 
meant to advance. 
 
216 Janet Halley makes a similar point, claiming that such reasoning is implicit in the Su-
preme Court’s decision in Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 505 (1976).  See Halley, supra 
note 3, at 928–29. 
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We then considered how to define immutability in the equal pro-
tection context.  In doing so, we looked to the principles animating 
equal protection analysis, focusing on the Supreme Court’s introduc-
tion of the immutability factor in Frontiero v. Richardson.217  The con-
clusion of our analysis was that, in the context of the Equal Protection 
Clause, immutability was concerned not with whether or not a trait 
could be changed, but whether the trait was voluntarily adopted.  
This definition tracked both the Court’s “accident of birth” language 
and drew upon the immutability factor’s roots in the Court’s illegiti-
macy cases.218  Focusing on immutability as an accident of birth 
helped explain why criminals should not be counted among the sus-
pect classifications; in addition, it also explained why the Court has 
described alienage as an immutable trait, rendering the immutability 
factor a necessary condition for suspect-classification status. 
Reconsidering the meaning and purpose of the immutability fac-
tor is particularly important at this juncture given the rise in litigation 
over same-sex marriage.  Courts, in assessing whether statutory 
schemes prohibiting same-sex marriage are constitutional, invariably 
delve into an analysis of whether sexual preference can be considered 
immutable.  Understanding immutable traits as accidents of birth 
changes the terms of the debate over same-sex marriage in a number 
of important ways. 
First, it renders analysis over whether sexual preference can be 
changed moot.  This is an important development not simply from a 
legal perspective.  From Michel Foucault’s repressive hypothesis219 to 
Kenji Yoshino’s theory of covering,220 scholars have worried about the 
 
217 411 U.S. 677, 686–87 (1973). 
218 Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972); see also Jimenez v. Weinberger, 
417 U.S. 628, 631–32 (1974). 
219 See MICHEL FOUCAULT, The Repressive Hypothesis, in THE FOUCAULT READER 301 (Paul Ra-
binow ed., 1984).  Foucault’s concern stems from the Enlightenment’s fascination with 
science; in turn, this fascination gave birth to a “new persecution of the peripheral sexu-
alities,” which “entailed an incorporation of perversions and a new specification of individuals.”  
Id. at 322.  Nowhere, on Foucault’s account, was this mechanism more evident than in the 
reconceptualization of homosexual conduct into a category of homosexuality: 
Nothing that went into his total composition was unaffected by his sexuality.  It was 
everywhere present in him:  at the root of all his actions because it was their in-
sidious and indefinitely active principle; written immodestly on his face and body 
because it was a secret that always gave itself away. 
  Id.  This reconceptualization—the shift from conduct to status—empowered Enlighten-
ment scientists to employ science as a tool to exercise power over these new statuses to 
manipulate, control, and cure the members of these “deviant” status groups.  Id. at 322–
23. 
220 See generally KENJI YOSHINO, COVERING:  THE HIDDEN ASSAULT ON OUR CIVIL RIGHTS 
(2006); Yoshino, supra note 153, at 772.  Yoshino’s primary concern is the way in which  
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effects of implying that sexual preference is something that requires 
modification.  To provide lesser protections to traits that can be 
changed implies some sort of expectation that such a trait can and 
should be modified.221  However, understanding immutability as con-
cerned not with the ability to change a trait, but with whether a trait 
was voluntarily adopted, ensures that equal protection analysis avoids 
such implications.  In this way, our definitional shift ensures that the 
immutability factor is not deployed as a tool to ensure conformity and 
assimilation. 
Second, understanding immutability as focused on entrance into 
the classification moves us away from the identity-based arguments 
deployed by courts considering the constitutionality of legislation 
that prohibits same-sex marriage.  As noted above, while differing in 
approach, the California, Connecticut and Iowa Supreme Courts all 
focused on the way in which sexual orientation plays an important 
role in the constitution of individual identity.222  In turn, all three 
courts reasoned that the important role sexual orientation plays in 
the constitution of individual identity should affect the way in which 
we understand sexual orientation to be a trait that can be changed.223  
However, if we understand the immutability inquiry as focused not on 
the ability to change a trait, but whether the trait is an accident of 
birth,224 identity-based arguments lose much of their traction as re-
lated to suspect classification analysis.225 
 
  the law protects traits, but not actions.  In turn, individuals are forced to mute some of 
their own behavioral traits—to “cover” their true identities.  Id. at 771–73.  Yoshino ex-
presses particular concern over the fact that traits that are mutable are not given the same 
protections as immutable traits; this distinction implies an expectation that individuals 
with mutable traits should in fact change them.  Id. 
221 Yoshino, supra note 153, at 877 (“Put differently, the descriptive claim that the group can 
assimilate because of the mutability or invisibility of its defining trait transmutes into the 
prescriptive claim that the group should assimilate with very little intervening investigation 
by a court.  Because of this, the immutability factor in equal protection analysis effectively 
translates into a demand that mutable groups convert, and the visibility factor effectively 
translates into a demand that invisible groups pass.” (emphasis in original)). 
222 See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 441 (Cal. 2008); Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. 
Health, 957 A.2d 407, 431 (Conn. 2008); Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 885 (Iowa 
2009). 
223 See supra note 222. 
224 To be sure, identity arguments could play a prominent role in determining whether sex-
ual orientation is an accident of birth.  See generally Stein, supra note 41 (discussing the 
immutability factor in equal protection jurisprudence as the central legal context for the 
“born that way” arguments for gay rights); Wardle, supra note 41 (focusing on the bio-
logical effects of homosexual behavior on human health).  However, as demonstrated by 
the recent spat of state supreme court decisions, identity arguments have been deployed 
to meet arguments about the ability to change sexual orientation.  It is these arguments 
that an “accident of birth” focus renders irrelevant. 
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On the other hand, shifting immutability’s focus away from exit 
and towards entrance leads to other important questions.  To say that 
immutability is concerned with accidents of birth does not tell us 
what an accident of birth is.  Applying our definition of immutability 
is particularly difficult once we begin to think about genetic disposi-
tions.  Should we consider people as being homosexual from birth?  
Are some people simply wired, from birth, to be criminals?  While 
such individuals might only act on genetic predispositions later in 
life, nothing in our analysis thus far precludes understanding such 
traits as immutable.  Indeed, given the volatile dispute over whether 
sexual orientation ought to be considered a suspect classification, this 
may be one of the central questions in future equal protection litiga-
tion. 
In answering this question, different elements of the current doc-
trine point us in different directions.  On the one hand, the Supreme 
Court has, at times, emphasized the fact that certain immutable traits 
are also “visible.”  For example, the Supreme Court, in finding that 
“close relatives” did not constitute a classification, explained its hold-
ing by saying that close relatives “do not exhibit obvious, immutable, 
or distinguishing characteristics that define them as a discrete 
group.”226  In Frontiero itself, the Court noted that “it can hardly be 
doubted that, in part because of the high visibility of the sex character-
istic, women still face pervasive, although at times more subtle, dis-
crimination in our educational institutions, in the job market and, 
perhaps most conspicuously, in the political arena.”227 
Focusing on visible immutable traits is understandable.  Only al-
lowing the traits we can see—like race and sex—to count as immuta-
ble traits takes courts out of the business of trying to determine how 
people are genetically wired.  It therefore would allow courts to sim-
ply take traits like sexual preference and criminality and deem them 
 
 
225 Of course, identity arguments will likely continue to play a prominent role in legislative 
initiatives providing for same-sex marriage.  See, e.g., An Act Implementing the Guarantee 
of Equal Protection Under the Constitution of the State for Same Sex Couples, No. 09-13 
2009 Conn. Acts (Reg. Sess.) (removing gender identity requirements from the state stat-
ute governing marriage); An Act To End Discrimination in Civil Marriage and Affirm Re-
ligious Freedom, Me. L.D. 1020 (124th Legis. 2009) (to be codified at Me. P.L. 2009, ch. 
82, § 650 et seq.) (same); An Act Affirming Religious Freedom Protections With Regard 
to Marriage and Prohibiting the Establishment of Civil Unions On or After January 1, 
2010, N.H. H.B. 73 (2009) (same); An Act to Amend the Domestic Relations Law, In Re-
lation to the Ability to Marry, N.Y. Assem. Bill No. A7732 (2009) (attempting the same). 
226 Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 602 (1987) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis add-
ed). 
227 Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (emphasis added). 
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mutable; they are simply not the types of traits that are imposed, in 
an obvious manner, at birth.  Thus, by emphasizing some of the 
Court’s gestures toward a “visibility factor,”228 courts could avoid de-
ciding whether some genetic traits qualify as accidents of birth for the 
purposes of the immutability inquiry. 
But the visibility factor itself stands on uneven foundations.  Most 
notably, alienage is far from visible,229 and yet the Court has both 
deemed alienage immutable230 and found alienage to be a suspect 
classification.231  In doing so, the Court has expressed serious concern 
that aliens might not receive fair representation in the political proc-
ess, constituting one of the discrete and insular minorities current 
equal protection doctrine was built to protect.232  Again, this is despite 
the fact that alienage is not a visible trait. 
Therefore, applying our definition of immutability in the same-sex 
marriage context does not end the conversation; it actually begins the 
conversation.  But it does so in a way that constitutes a significant im-
provement.  First and foremost, it instructs courts to get out of the 
business of asking whether sexual orientation can be changed.  In-
deed, in this way, our own definition of immutability tracks some of 
the identity arguments currently deployed by courts in cases address-
ing same-sex marriage.233 
Moreover, defining immutability as coerced entrance explains why 
the immutability inquiry is relevant to equal protection analysis.  In 
turn, it draws our attention to the way in which immutability, along 
with the traditional indicia of suspectness, can be used to determine 
when certain groups are not able to avail themselves of the benefits 
typically afforded by the democratic process.  By reconnecting immu-
tability to the process-based focus of equal protection doctrine, we 
have framed the question courts must ask when considering whether 
sexual preference is immutable:  Is sexual preference the type of trait 
 
228 See generally Yoshino, supra note 3, at 492 (describing the courts’ definition of visibility and 
arguing that “visible groups are uniquely vulnerable in the political process”). 
229 But see Victor C. Romero, The Congruence Principle Applied:  Rethinking Equal Protection Re-
view of Federal Alienage Classifications After Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 76 OR. L. 
REV. 425, 455 (1997).  In his conclusion, Romero states that aliens are a “readily identifi-
able group of people, composed mostly of people of color.”  Id.  It is not clear, however, if 
he is making an argument that alienage should be considered a visible trait, especially 
given the piece’s focus on intersectionality. 
230 Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 351 (1979). 
231 Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371–72 (1971). 
232 Id. 
233 See generally, In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 441 (Cal. 2008); Kerrigan v. Comm’r of 
Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 431 (Conn. 2008); Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 885 
(Iowa 2009). 
56 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 12:1 
 
that is simply thrust on the individual from birth?  In answering this 
question, courts should consider whether imposing legal burdens for 
sexual preference bears some relationship to individual responsibil-
ity.  As we have seen, a tenuous link between the imposition of legal 
burdens on a group and the “basic concept of . . . individual respon-
sibility”234 provides a strong indication that the statute or regulation in 
question was not the result of properly functioning democratic deci-
sion-making, but of inter-group animus.235  It is here that our inquiry 
regarding whether sexual orientation should be deemed a suspect 
classification should begin.  Does what we know about the origins of 
sexual orientation, combined with the history of discrimination 
against homosexuals and their current share of political power lead 
us to believe that legal burdens imposed based upon sexual orienta-
tion are the result of democratic deliberation or inter-group animus?  
It is in the answer to this question that the future of same-sex mar-
riage resides. 
 
234 Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973)  
235 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (“[A]ll legal restrictions which cur-
tail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect.  That is not to say that 
all such restrictions are unconstitutional.  It is to say that courts must subject them to the 
most rigid scrutiny.  Pressing public necessity may sometimes justify the existence of such 
restrictions; racial antagonism never can.”). 
